3 ms·
A malicious module would only need to act like VW's defeat device to overcome that check. When it senses some integrity/signing routine, it simply isolates itse
by lvs 11y ago
A malicious module would only need to act like VW's defeat device to overcome that check. When it senses some integrity/signing routine, it simply isolates itself from a verifiable circuit.
- Someone 11y agoFor VW, that was easy because the test setup was known and very rigid. If you randomly check, say, power usage and latency of the on-board RNG (ideally combined with high-resolution IR recordings of the CPU), it will, at least, be harder for the CPU manufacturer to install a backdoored RNG that is active most of the time (but one that only gets activated after receiving some trigger, say a specific instruction sequence would still be virtually undetectable)
- Nrsolis 11y agoThe problem you are trying to solve is much closer to the "decidability problem" than you might suppose at first sight.
- readams 11y agoThere is no procedure you can run that would show that the RNG was compromised. They would still give you a stream that's indistinguishable from random noise, except it would be generated from a seed known to the attacker.