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I wouldn’t equate free will with physicalism. It’s possible that physicalism might entail the absence of free will (I don’t claim to know the answer to this que
by foldr 11y ago
I wouldn’t equate free will with physicalism. It’s possible that physicalism might entail the absence of free will (I don’t claim to know the answer to this question), but it’s pretty clear that the entailment doesn’t go in the other direction.
I’m a bit frustrated here, because physicists often seem to retreat to this position that it’s all just a question of terminology once people start pushing back against their philosophical claims. If Aaronson actually is using terms in such a weird way as you suggest, then I just have no idea what he is on about. We already have a perfectly fine word that means unpredictable; there’s no need to repurpose “free”.
I admit that I have no way of knowing what he has or hasn’t read, and my comment on that was snarky. But he doesn’t refer to any philosophical work in the interview, and I couldn’t find much published work by him that really engages with the current literature.
- moultano 11y agoI think Aaronson believes the following. If there are provably no experiments that could differentiate a propery X from "free" then X is equivalent to "free." I think unpredictability passes that test.
- foldr 11y agoHmm, that seems like a fairly banal observation. Of course you can't tell whether someone has free will looking from the outside. In the general case the behavior of someone with free will will be indistinguishable from random behavior. If free will was just about patterns of behavior then it wouldn't be a very interesting philosophical issue.
- Tyr42 11y agoHere's the paper he wrote on it, I think it'd be good to take a look at it directly. https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0159 https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0159 Scott is making a pair of claims: If it's possible to build a fast, noninvasive, perfect predictor then what more can science say to show that people don't have free will? If it's impossible to build such a predictor, for some fundamental reason, then what more can science say to show that free will exists.
- foldr 11y agoAh, in the paper he says that he's not actually talking about free will. That makes it less confusing. But I still think he's making much too strong a connection between Knightian unpredictability and free will. I don't see any reason at all to think that the former is a necessary condition for the latter, and he doesn't really attempt to argue the point. (He promises that he's going to argue it in section 2.5, but then section 2.5 ends up only talking about problems of personal identity.)
- moultano 11y ago>Of course you can't tell whether someone has free will looking from the outside. Before quantum mechanics and uncomputability, the "of course" went the other direction.
- foldr 11y agoI don't see how that makes any difference. Could you expand?
- moultano 11y agoI don't think it's obvious that you can't tell whether someone has free will from the outside. Considering the enormous success physics has had with explaining every other phenomenon from the outside, that seems like a very strong statement.
- foldr 11y agoHow would you distinguish decisions that were freely made from decisions made at random?
- moultano 11y agoIf we can't, then that says something doesn't it?
- foldr 11y agoI just don't see how. It seems like a fairly obvious point that the two systems would be indistinguishable from the outside.
- moultano 11y agoIn that case, the pragmatists would say that the distinction isn't meaningful, that free will is a concept with no meaning, and end the debate there.