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>But the argument isn't as simple as "physicalism entails the absence of free will". Right, I said that's probably all he should say. >His point is that even
by foldr 11y ago
>But the argument isn't as simple as "physicalism entails the absence of free will".
Right, I said that's probably all he should say.
>His point is that even if our actions are (probabilistically) determined by a set of underlying physical laws, it may still be that the character of those laws is such that it is fundamentally impossible to predict future actions, in which case we would still have meaningful free will.
It's hard to see how it makes any difference to my level of freedom whether someone else can successfully predict what I'm going to do. You can predict pretty reliably that I'm going to have breakfast in the morning, but it's still a free decision on my part.
>but the characterization of free will in terms of the concrete question "is it possible to build a prediction machine?" seems like a useful and novel contribution that doesn't just reduce to the old question of "is physicalism true".
It seems to me that the question of whether or not we have free well is largely orthogonal to the question of whether or not our actions are predictable. I suspect that all four combinations of predictable/unpredictable and free/unfree are logical possibilities. So I think Aaronson is conflating a lot of things that ought not to be conflated, and which have been endlessly and subtly picked apart in a philosophical literature that he appears not to have bothered reading. (I haven't read that much of it either, but it already contains pretty much every idea about free will that is likely to occur to anyone in our present state of knowledge.)
- davmre 11y agoIt feels like this is mostly a disagreement over language. We all agree that determinism and "predictability" are independent questions. You've equated "free will" with non-determinism and therefore see predictability to be orthogonal, whereas Aaronson equates "free will" with non-predictability, making determinism orthogonal though I imagine he'd argue for it on other grounds. It's not clear that there's an actual disagreement over anything except which words to use for which concepts. FWIW, I think Scott has read more of the philosophical literature on free will than probably anyone else in the world with a comparable level of quantum-physical expertise. If he's too confused to be allowed to discuss these issues, then what is the path by which philosophers expect to stay relevant and up-to-date with new knowledge? A field whose currency of legitimacy is "you must have devoted your life to understanding every detail of dispute in the existing literature" is not a living field that hopes to learn from outsiders and grow with new scientific inquiry. I think the best philosophers recognize this, and are willing to engage more broadly.
- foldr 11y agoI wouldn’t equate free will with physicalism. It’s possible that physicalism might entail the absence of free will (I don’t claim to know the answer to this question), but it’s pretty clear that the entailment doesn’t go in the other direction. I’m a bit frustrated here, because physicists often seem to retreat to this position that it’s all just a question of terminology once people start pushing back against their philosophical claims. If Aaronson actually is using terms in such a weird way as you suggest, then I just have no idea what he is on about. We already have a perfectly fine word that means unpredictable; there’s no need to repurpose “free”. I admit that I have no way of knowing what he has or hasn’t read, and my comment on that was snarky. But he doesn’t refer to any philosophical work in the interview, and I couldn’t find much published work by him that really engages with the current literature.
- moultano 11y agoI think Aaronson believes the following. If there are provably no experiments that could differentiate a propery X from "free" then X is equivalent to "free." I think unpredictability passes that test.
- foldr 11y agoHmm, that seems like a fairly banal observation. Of course you can't tell whether someone has free will looking from the outside. In the general case the behavior of someone with free will will be indistinguishable from random behavior. If free will was just about patterns of behavior then it wouldn't be a very interesting philosophical issue.
- Tyr42 11y agoHere's the paper he wrote on it, I think it'd be good to take a look at it directly. https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0159 https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0159 Scott is making a pair of claims: If it's possible to build a fast, noninvasive, perfect predictor then what more can science say to show that people don't have free will? If it's impossible to build such a predictor, for some fundamental reason, then what more can science say to show that free will exists.