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The discussion of whether or not we have free will strikes me as confused. Aaronson suggests that we would clearly not have free will in a scenario where “Ever
by foldr 11y ago
The discussion of whether or not we have free will strikes me as confused. Aaronson suggests that we would clearly not have free will in a scenario where “Everything [we] did could be fully traced to causal antecedents external to [us], plus pure randomness—not in some philosophical imagination, but for real, and on a routine basis”. The caveat “external to [us]” is doing a lot of work here, but it really has no discernible meaning. (Is a cause “external to us” if it’s not within our brains? Why would that matter? What is the status of chains of causation that lead from the outside world to goings on in our brains?) Without that essentially meaningless caveat, the statement is simply a trivially true disjunction of the logical possibilities given physicalism. Of course, if physicalism is true, then everything that we do is either determined by the laws of physics or not determined by anything. If that entails that we don’t have free will, then Aaronson should just say that he thinks physicalism is true and that he thinks that physicalism entails the absence of free will. On the other hand, if we don’t simply assume physicalism, then the fact that our behavior is determined by the laws of physics really does nothing to argue against free will. Everything would hang on how minds interact with physical reality, and we simply know nothing about how that might work. For example, it might be that God ensures that the physical world operates so as to respect the free decisions made by our minds. Or it might be that phenomena which are random from the point of view of physics are (sometimes) linked to free decisions made by minds. Nothing is known, so nothing can be concluded.
I'd also have to say that Aaronson lacks imagination in a crucial respect. He claims that in any "imaginable" universe it will hold that "if you knew the complete state of the universe, you could use it to calculate [either deterministically or probabilistically] everything I’d do in the future." But of course it's very easy to imagine a universe where this is not the case. E.g., any universe where minds make free decisions that lack physical causes. We know that people have in fact imagined this sort of universe.
- wfo 11y agoYes, very well put. I really enjoyed his technical answers, but when he dives into the philosophy I was disappointed to see the same very naive and narcissistic attitudes so many scientists have (that are even alluded to at the beginning of the article): you don't need to try to understand philosophy, just use your superior STEM brain and technical intuitions and if you think about it for a few minutes, with a healthy splash of "assuming my thesis, it is obvious my thesis is correct" , the problem is trivial -- why have people been thinking about it for centuries?
- foldr 11y agoAgree completely. I don't think you deserve to be downvoted for saying that. Everything Aaronson's saying on this topic has been exhaustively discussed in the philosophical literature.
- wfo 11y agoI don't think I deserve it either but I am not surprised or particularly offended. Pop scientists like Dawkins and NDT are rightly mocked when they say things like this because we can safely feel superior to them, but a tech golden boy like Aaronson can do the exact same thing and since he knows about quantum and does computer science it doesn't matter what he says or how far out of his depth he ventures any comment about him which doesn't border on hero-worship is verboten. Downvotes or no it's worth saying. Defending any social science or humanity at all is hard work on a forum like this, but I think it's important.
- Al-Khwarizmi 11y agoHe was asked about his opinion on free will and he gave it. I don't see where he is disdaining philosophy or saying his explanation is superior to anything.
- AndrewKemendo 11y agoThe caveat “external to [us]” is doing a lot of work here I think it's just sloppy discussion. Any hard-determinist will say that every interaction is pre-determined based on a previous interaction. The compatibilist approach tries to reconcile hard-determinism with the illusion of free will in a reference frame of the individual - but I think falls apart. I think Aaronson is trying to convey this particular philosophy. "if you knew the complete state of the universe, you could use it to calculate [either deterministically or probabilistically] everything I’d do in the future." Fortunately for us, Godel explored this exhaustively and concluded (though did not prove) that this is not possible. See also the Munchhausen Trilemma of proofs for problems proving any epistemological inquiry. [1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_determinism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_determinism [2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism [3]http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/ [4]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCnchhausen_trilemma https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCnchhausen_trilemma
- pron 11y ago> Godel explored this exhaustively and concluded (though did not prove) that this is not possible While I agree that Aaronson's take on philosophy is not very original or profound, I don't think that Gödel concluded anything of the sort, and if he said something in that vein (assuming you're referring to the discussion on mechanism in the link you're provided), it is more an expression of his faith that any problem can be solved (and since not every problem can be solved by a machine, the mind is more powerful than any machine) -- hardly a conclusion.
- davmre 11y agoI think you're missing the point somewhat. Yes, Aaronson assumes that something like physicalism is true, which I think is fairly defensible as a 21st-century scientist. But the argument isn't as simple as "physicalism entails the absence of free will". His point is that even if our actions are (probabilistically) determined by a set of underlying physical laws, it may still be that the character of those laws is such that it is fundamentally impossible to predict future actions, in which case we would still have meaningful free will. The main form of prediction-impossibility he mentions is that our minds might depend meaningfully on quantum states, which are governed by the no-cloning theorem and therefore impossible even in principle to extract. Whether or not this is true is an open question, but the characterization of free will in terms of the concrete question "is it possible to build a prediction machine?" seems like a useful and novel contribution that doesn't just reduce to the old question of "is physicalism true".
- davmre 11y agoTo follow up: I personally see some extra subtlety here, in that even if a prediction machine did exist, we could still have a meaningful form of free will, because that machine would be governed by Rice's theorem (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rice's_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rice's_theorem), which says that in general the only way to predict the outcome of a computation is to run the computation. (this is closely related to the halting problem). That is, even if I could capture the relevant aspects of your mind state on a computer, i.e., the no-cloning theorem is not a barrier, it's still the case that the only way for me to predict what you will do in two minutes' time is to actually run your mind inside the computer for two minutes of subjective time. This would constitute a prediction machine in Aaronson's sense, assuming the computer could run faster than realtime. But since the computation that occurs is literally following your thought process step by step (Rice's theorem says there are no shortcuts), there's a real sense in which the decision was not determined until you -- the version inside the computer -- actually made it. Of course this account depends on a functionalist/computational theory of mind, which can be quibbled with in all sorts of ways. But it does seem important for the philosophical discussion on free will to at least take into account the things we now know about the nature of computation, the character of physical law, and other scientific/mathematical questions, that were not known decades or centuries ago when the philosophical battle lines were being drawn. Yes, scientists can be arrogant and are often just wrong or deeply misinformed on philosophical questions. But that doesn't remove the responsibility of philosophers to engage with the frontiers of knowledge on these issues, which means engaging with people like Scott rather than just dismissing them as "confused". (as if anyone thinking about free will has ever not been confused!)
- derptacious 11y agoSharp response! Yes, the "external to us" caveat is very powerful because it is contextually ambiguous and its scope can potentially reach the location of every atom in the universe. Every atom in the universe is not trackable because they are not self-tracking. The only way out is retreat into, "we're in a simulation..."