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This article was and remains wrong, and at least in the comments so far most people appear to be missing the point, which in turn weakens security. Biometrics a
by xoa 11y ago
This article was and remains wrong, and at least in the comments so far most people appear to be missing the point, which in turn weakens security. Biometrics are neither user names nor passwords, they're a perfectly valid factor (along with something you know and something you have) with their own strengths and weaknesses vs various threat models. One of the most absolutely fundamental mistakes that can be made with security is sacrificing the good at the alter of the perfect, because overall security is always, 100% of the time an economic equation, a time/resource expenditure tradeoff between an attacker and defender for a given value of information. "Security" as a field also exists almost exclusively for the benefit of and requiring interaction with humans, which means that the human factor must always be a fundamental consideration as well. Or more pithily, a "security" system is garbage if its users can't use it, won't use it, find it too easy to screw up, or even if the costs it imposes are greater then the benefits provided.
Biometrics, including finger prints, are human friendly, and that instantly makes them worthy of consideration as part of a system. Touch ID or the like can enable a person to use an extremely strong password that would otherwise be completely uneconomic, and the combination of a limited time, extremely fast biometric shortcut with a very strong core password, particularly if combined with coercion code use (only possible for now via jailbreak but something Apple or another manufacturer could and should implement at all levels), remote lockout (long available everywhere), etc., may be significantly better then merely a PIN code alone.
Threat models cannot be ignored for a security system, because they define the system. The greatest threat most people face are remote attacks, with the next greatest being scatter shots of various sorts (in other words, somebody was looking to steal or attack a device, not your device in particular). Persistent targeted threats are an entirely different situation and a password alone is not even necessarily better in a mobile scenario, because in a mobile scenario you often do not have even a modicum of control over your environment. A fingerprint might be possible to lift and use as the author links, but a PIN code or password can be taken, often even more easily, via shoulder surfing or cameras. In fact in the modern first world environment bird's eye view (ceiling/pole-mounted etc) surveillance cameras are becoming ever more ubiquitous and ever higher resolution. Are people going to seriously suggest nobody use their mobile device anywhere with a surveillance system? More and more, how will you even know that? Taking advantage of the ever increasing cost/performance/size/power improvements powered by the smartphone revolution, retailers are interested in ever more camera use not for thieves but for metrics, to figure out exactly what shoppers are doing down to precisely what they're looking at and for how long. The retailers of course have no interest in your phone info, and in fact an interest in not making people worried about that sort of thing. But if we're going to consider someone going to the specific trouble to rapidly spoof biometric identity for a specific device, then it's necessary to consider that once the cameras exist at all access for non-intended purposes may be just a hack or national-security-directive away.
Basically, it's frustrating to still see people pointing to "somebody broke into this security system!" as if it means anything without thinking about the time/resource cost and threat model. Biometrics absolutely have a role to play in general authentication for the general population for the foreseeable future. There are paths for improvement there just as in other areas, perhaps culminating in fusion technologies like security authentication implants wired into our brains someday, but we'll need functional authentication to get us that far and passwords alone do not cut for most of the population as currently implemented.
- junker101 11y agoI think you may also be misconstruing the point. Saying that fingerprints aren't passwords is _not_ the same as saying a fingerprint shouldn't be required to unlock a phone. (as with most web logins, its userid + password. But shouldn't be one or the other) The key point though is that security tokens must be changeable/revocable and and bio-metric data is not-so-much.
- giovannibajo1 11y agoPlease describe the threat model in which fingerprint is insecure because it can't be revoked. Without threat model, evaluation of "security" is useless
- tniswong 11y agoWhen you walk around in your daily life, do you write your password down on everything you touch? Why not?
- dpark 11y agoHow is this strawman even a little bit relevant to the question posed? You don't write your password down on everything you touch even though it is revocable.
- jschwartzi 11y agoThat's the point. You do leave fingerprints on things you touch. Fingerprints that can be copied.
- dpark 11y agoIt doesn't answer the question. Passwords can be revoked and you still don't want to leave them everywhere. Need for revocability has nothing to do with maintaining the "secret" and everything to do with mitigating the impact of a compromise. If a password is leaked, you need to revoke it in order to mitigate the potential damage. If a fingerprint is leaked, do you need to do the same? No, because the security of the fingerprint is not tied to its secrecy. Fingerprints are not secret. They are just hard to reproduce. Trying to equate fingerprints to passwords or usernames will inevitably result in absurd comparisons because fingerprints are neither of these things. They are an entirely different type of entity. Fun fact: fingerprint access to banking info on your phone constitutes two factor authentication. Factor one is the fingerprint (something you are). Factor two is the phone containing the already-authenticated app (something you have). Arguably this is a more secure way to access your bank than the typical one factor username+password you would use online.