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From a Schneier blog thread: "Retroshare has enough layers of security that the even the nsa will have to work really hard if they want to get in there." (Benn
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
From a Schneier blog thread:
"Retroshare has enough layers of security that the even the nsa will have to work really hard if they want to get in there." (Benni from Germany)
"And it's written in a risky language using shoddy libraries on platforms NSA has 0-days and automated attack systems for. I'm sure that this combination will be "really hard" for NSA to penetrate. ;)" (Nick P.)
It's a nice idea and little project worth some development, though. I agree it's the closest thing, outside Freenet, to what the OP describes. It needs to be clean-slated in a safer, but low-level, language with the risky libraries substituted or improved. The protocols will need to be verified and implemented by high-assurance security community. Covert channel analysis. The works. Then, it will be good enough to stop many high-strength attackers enough to matter.
Of course, anything like that will be throttled and filtered by ISP's. Might be best to start disguising the traffic as HTTPS connections or something like my homebrew solutions did.
- buovjaga 11y agoThis security company is reviewing Retroshare: https://www.elttam.com.au/blog/a-review-of-the-eff-secure-messaging-scorecard-pt1/ https://www.elttam.com.au/blog/a-review-of-the-eff-secure-me...
- nickpsecurity 11y agoGood to know. What sysrems has that company built that resisted nation-state or top-tier effort to break the security? Probably nothing? Further, is this one time or will they review in parallel with each code submission? These kind of questions should lead you to the conclusion they'll merely find and patch some flaws. Others will remain or be introduced.