5 ms·

"Marines in planes, on the other hand, are likely to accept similar risk to marines on the ground if it reduces risk for all." Is this an issue of different cu

by adamson 11y ago

"Marines in planes, on the other hand, are likely to accept similar risk to marines on the ground if it reduces risk for all." Is this an issue of different cultures within different departments, or different objectives, or what? I would hope that combined arms in a modern military would break down divisions in combat behavior like this

beloch 11y ago
Purely on the basis of training, equipment, and investment of taxpayer dollars, a pilot's life is worth a helluva lot more than an infantryman's life, and air force pilots are probably aware of this. They're like the modern day equivalent of noblemen as mounted heavy cavalry. They feel the duty to protect the peons with pitch-forks on the front lines, but they're not trained to do so recklessly. A platoon getting wiped out is a far smaller loss than losing a plane. Such are the economic realities of war. Pilot training no doubt reflects this. I honestly don't know much about marine aviator culture, but I'd be very surprised if they don't see themselves as having more in common with marine infantry than air force pilots do. That commonality probably makes them a lot more committed to keeping ground forces safe when flying CAS missions. I could be wrong. I am speculating here. I'd welcome the opinion of somebody in a position to know better.
- awinter-py 11y ago
  That's a pretty strong statement to justify with 'no doubt'. DOD has a zillion ways they support the families of KIA soldiers. Even just looking at economics, losing 10 soldiers isn't cheap.
  - beloch 11y ago
    An F-35 starts at around $100M, and that's the plane the air force is touting to take over the CAS role. Does it really cost more than $10M per infantryman killed?
    - awinter-py 11y ago
      ok but the F-35 isn't the go-to plane for CAS right now. On the opposite end of the spectrum you can get an AC-208 'combat caravan' for $150k in non-sequential bills and a late-model hyundai sonata (KBB value $15k). Someone cooked up a model showing that the embraer super tucano would have been more effective in the CAS mission in afghanistan than some of the high power jets we used, in addition to 10x cheaper.
      - paulmd 11y ago
        The USAF does not fly the AC208 or the Super Tucano in combat. There is no prize for hypothetical savings. I would love to see such airframes flown, they would be much more effective in many roles than "super-airframes" like the F-35. But that's not the US military philosophy. We fly the best and most expensive, even if it's 10x as expensive as an airframe that's 75% as effective. It's a calculation that government debt is cheaper than having to face the public over killed and captured soldiers.
        awinter-py 10y ago
        The writers arguing for this (not me, I don't have experience or expertise to have an opinion) say that cheaper airframes are more effective because of slower stall speed, ability to operate at lower altitude, and greater fuel stamina, all of which translate to better loiter characteristics. Also have heard that ground commanders hate the high-altitude planes for CAS because they're less likely to correctly discriminate the situtation on the ground before unloading. To your point -- yes, we don't operate AC208; I think iraq is the only one who does. (And if the sight of a hellfire stapled to the wing of a small turbopro doesn't make you want to run and hide, I don't know what will). But we also don't operate the F-35 in the CAS mission. neither plane is a good example of a CAS plane.
      - bubuga 11y ago
        > On the opposite end of the spectrum you can get an AC-208 'combat caravan' for $150k in non-sequential bills and a late-model hyundai sonata (KBB value $15k). Even considering that hypothetical scenario, there's also the cost of training everyone throughout the logistics chain and required to get the plane operational and in the air. If you lose a peasant, you lose a peasant. If you lose a knight, you also lose the squire, the page, etc etc etc.
  - bubuga 11y ago
    > losing 10 soldiers isn't cheap. It's cheaper than losing the plane, the pilot, the resources spent in training, maintenance, and preparation of the whole logistic structure. Not to mention the asset and its capabilities. After all, a grunt with a gun is less of a threat than a plane carrying an entire arsenal.
- WalterBright 11y ago
  In WW1, the aviators were drawn from the nobility. Until they all got slaughtered. Then the lower classes started getting accepted into the flying schools. This is the background of the movie "The Blue Max".
- Warhawg01 10y ago
  > "...but I'd be very surprised if they don't see themselves as having more in common with marine infantry than air force pilots do." You're exactly right. AF pilot here, not a Marine, but it is my understanding that all Marine officers go infantry school first. The Marines are very good at Combined Arms - it's what they do. But that doesn't mean they are necessarily more committed to CAS. CAS is pretty much all A-10 pilots do. They live and breath supporting dudes on the ground. Objective #1 for just about every CAS training mission is something along the lines of "Achieve the Ground Commander's intent." One key difference is that Marine pilot mostly provide CAS for other Marines. AF CAS pilots mostly provide CAS for the Army -- a completely separate service. So going back to Objective #1, a Marine pilot could very well personally know that ground commander. Went to various schools together, crossed paths, etc. The USMC isn't terribly big, all things considered. An Air Force pilot has about a 0.1% change of knowing who that Army ground commander is. Question becomes, does this matter? A Marine may say it does, and I won't argue with him. I will say this, as a A-10 pilot: I don't give a shit you who are. If you need CAS, I will give you everything I've got. Even if all you need is for me to stare at building with my targeting pod for three hours to to see if any bad dudes are hiding inside. That's how I was raised, and that's what teach brand new A-10 pilots.
woodman 11y ago
All of the above. The USMC is designed to be quickly deployed in such a way that combat operations can continue to be performed with no support dependency (1-3 months, I don't remember). In order to make that happen they've duplicated a slimmed down version of a bunch of DOD components: air, armor, artillery, navy, etc. The moment one of those components underperforms in comparison to the fatter DOD version - it calls the whole endeavor into question, so there is considerable incentive to the folks at the top to make it work. Long story short: the USMC is a statically compiled version of kill.exe. They rotate the pilots to ground operations as well, FACs - forward air controllers, so there is a pretty close link at the company level: the FAC knows the pilots in the air. Rifle squad leaders are required to be qualified JFOs, joint fire observers, so for every 13 infantrymen you've got someone who can direct fire support. The common practice in the infantry is for individuals to train in tasks performed by the next two levels in one's chain of command, so every rifleman is effectively trained to interface with fire support. This requirement for interoperability is often reflect in weapon design: tanks have comm boxes on the back, grunt phones, where an infantryman can grab the phone and direct the tank commander. This leads to the implementation of the "billet supersedes rank" philosophy, where you often have a lance corporal instructing an officer - and the instruction is cheerfully met with "Direct fire B2, fire for effect, aye aye lance corporal". The effect of the culture can't be overstated, I've seen a lot of brave men from every branch, but in my experience as an infantry machinegunner - the USMC air wing operated on a whole other level of "Just make it happen". Judgement calls are made at a much lower level in the Corps, which can lead to emotion driven mistakes, but generally results in faster decisions by those with greater situation awareness.

by adamson 11y ago

beloch 11y ago

Purely on the basis of training, equipment, and investment of taxpayer dollars, a pilot's life is worth a helluva lot more than an infantryman's life, and air force pilots are probably aware of this. They're like the modern day equivalent of noblemen as mounted heavy cavalry. They feel the duty to protect the peons with pitch-forks on the front lines, but they're not trained to do so recklessly. A platoon getting wiped out is a far smaller loss than losing a plane. Such are the economic realities of war. Pilot training no doubt reflects this. I honestly don't know much about marine aviator culture, but I'd be very surprised if they don't see themselves as having more in common with marine infantry than air force pilots do. That commonality probably makes them a lot more committed to keeping ground forces safe when flying CAS missions. I could be wrong. I am speculating here. I'd welcome the opinion of somebody in a position to know better.

awinter-py 11y ago
That's a pretty strong statement to justify with 'no doubt'. DOD has a zillion ways they support the families of KIA soldiers. Even just looking at economics, losing 10 soldiers isn't cheap.
- beloch 11y ago
  An F-35 starts at around $100M, and that's the plane the air force is touting to take over the CAS role. Does it really cost more than $10M per infantryman killed?
  - awinter-py 11y ago
    ok but the F-35 isn't the go-to plane for CAS right now. On the opposite end of the spectrum you can get an AC-208 'combat caravan' for $150k in non-sequential bills and a late-model hyundai sonata (KBB value $15k). Someone cooked up a model showing that the embraer super tucano would have been more effective in the CAS mission in afghanistan than some of the high power jets we used, in addition to 10x cheaper.
    - paulmd 11y ago
      The USAF does not fly the AC208 or the Super Tucano in combat. There is no prize for hypothetical savings. I would love to see such airframes flown, they would be much more effective in many roles than "super-airframes" like the F-35. But that's not the US military philosophy. We fly the best and most expensive, even if it's 10x as expensive as an airframe that's 75% as effective. It's a calculation that government debt is cheaper than having to face the public over killed and captured soldiers.
      - awinter-py 10y ago
        The writers arguing for this (not me, I don't have experience or expertise to have an opinion) say that cheaper airframes are more effective because of slower stall speed, ability to operate at lower altitude, and greater fuel stamina, all of which translate to better loiter characteristics. Also have heard that ground commanders hate the high-altitude planes for CAS because they're less likely to correctly discriminate the situtation on the ground before unloading. To your point -- yes, we don't operate AC208; I think iraq is the only one who does. (And if the sight of a hellfire stapled to the wing of a small turbopro doesn't make you want to run and hide, I don't know what will). But we also don't operate the F-35 in the CAS mission. neither plane is a good example of a CAS plane.
    - bubuga 11y ago
      > On the opposite end of the spectrum you can get an AC-208 'combat caravan' for $150k in non-sequential bills and a late-model hyundai sonata (KBB value $15k). Even considering that hypothetical scenario, there's also the cost of training everyone throughout the logistics chain and required to get the plane operational and in the air. If you lose a peasant, you lose a peasant. If you lose a knight, you also lose the squire, the page, etc etc etc.
- bubuga 11y ago
  > losing 10 soldiers isn't cheap. It's cheaper than losing the plane, the pilot, the resources spent in training, maintenance, and preparation of the whole logistic structure. Not to mention the asset and its capabilities. After all, a grunt with a gun is less of a threat than a plane carrying an entire arsenal.
WalterBright 11y ago
In WW1, the aviators were drawn from the nobility. Until they all got slaughtered. Then the lower classes started getting accepted into the flying schools. This is the background of the movie "The Blue Max".
Warhawg01 10y ago
> "...but I'd be very surprised if they don't see themselves as having more in common with marine infantry than air force pilots do." You're exactly right. AF pilot here, not a Marine, but it is my understanding that all Marine officers go infantry school first. The Marines are very good at Combined Arms - it's what they do. But that doesn't mean they are necessarily more committed to CAS. CAS is pretty much all A-10 pilots do. They live and breath supporting dudes on the ground. Objective #1 for just about every CAS training mission is something along the lines of "Achieve the Ground Commander's intent." One key difference is that Marine pilot mostly provide CAS for other Marines. AF CAS pilots mostly provide CAS for the Army -- a completely separate service. So going back to Objective #1, a Marine pilot could very well personally know that ground commander. Went to various schools together, crossed paths, etc. The USMC isn't terribly big, all things considered. An Air Force pilot has about a 0.1% change of knowing who that Army ground commander is. Question becomes, does this matter? A Marine may say it does, and I won't argue with him. I will say this, as a A-10 pilot: I don't give a shit you who are. If you need CAS, I will give you everything I've got. Even if all you need is for me to stare at building with my targeting pod for three hours to to see if any bad dudes are hiding inside. That's how I was raised, and that's what teach brand new A-10 pilots.

woodman 11y ago

All of the above. The USMC is designed to be quickly deployed in such a way that combat operations can continue to be performed with no support dependency (1-3 months, I don't remember). In order to make that happen they've duplicated a slimmed down version of a bunch of DOD components: air, armor, artillery, navy, etc. The moment one of those components underperforms in comparison to the fatter DOD version - it calls the whole endeavor into question, so there is considerable incentive to the folks at the top to make it work. Long story short: the USMC is a statically compiled version of kill.exe. They rotate the pilots to ground operations as well, FACs - forward air controllers, so there is a pretty close link at the company level: the FAC knows the pilots in the air. Rifle squad leaders are required to be qualified JFOs, joint fire observers, so for every 13 infantrymen you've got someone who can direct fire support. The common practice in the infantry is for individuals to train in tasks performed by the next two levels in one's chain of command, so every rifleman is effectively trained to interface with fire support. This requirement for interoperability is often reflect in weapon design: tanks have comm boxes on the back, grunt phones, where an infantryman can grab the phone and direct the tank commander. This leads to the implementation of the "billet supersedes rank" philosophy, where you often have a lance corporal instructing an officer - and the instruction is cheerfully met with "Direct fire B2, fire for effect, aye aye lance corporal". The effect of the culture can't be overstated, I've seen a lot of brave men from every branch, but in my experience as an infantry machinegunner - the USMC air wing operated on a whole other level of "Just make it happen". Judgement calls are made at a much lower level in the Corps, which can lead to emotion driven mistakes, but generally results in faster decisions by those with greater situation awareness.