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>but you can't expand it to a larger group of angels. Your phrasing and labeling of "angels" is not the same as mine. We are starting from different assumptio

by jasode 11y ago

>but you can't expand it to a larger group of angels. Your phrasing and labeling of "angels" is not the same as mine. We are starting from different assumptions. In my opinion, you've made a leap of logic and a priori called the abstract actors in the government, "angels". I would weaken your sentence to say: "but you can't expand it to a larger group of 3rd-parties." It's critical that I call them 3rd-parties because it is not yet known if they will behave with angel or demon intentions. It's also impossible for technology to determine that. >You are arguing that we can't trust the government. While that might be true, that is an entirely different debate I respect that you consider it a separate issue but I think that bad actors (or sometimes incompetence without malice[1]) within the government is intertwined with what an "angel" is. To not get bogged down on "angel", let's say we just consider if there's a way for technology to create a backdoor that only works for the government but not non-government. Again, the answer would be no. [1]such as the leaks of SSN, mothers maiden name, etc from OPM backround checks: https://www.google.com/search?q=opm+background+checks+leaked https://www.google.com/search?q=opm+background+checks+leaked

slg 11y ago
I think you just proved my point of why no one is changing their mind on this issue. You went from saying you had a trivial mathematical argument to debating semantics and disagreeing on the meaning of the word "angel". Politicians thrive on those type of semantic arguments. If you want to change their minds, you have to get better at explaining that mathematical argument more convincingly than this video did or you did in your first post.
- jasode 11y ago
  >You went from ... I went from Math to Semantics because I was engaging with your points specifically... and you mentioned the technology angle because... CodeGrey mentioned it in the video. I wasn't making a universal treatise about government backdoors such that anyone from anti-vaccination parents to moon landing deniers will be convinced of the merits. The technology impossibility of digital locks used by angels-vs-demons mentioned by CodeGrey is a red herring and not really part of the debate that I've heard. Instead, people like Obama/FBI/NSA already know that a backdoor provided to the government is impossible to keep out of criminals' hands. They knowingly avoid mentioning the misuse by criminals and only highlight the benefits of catching terrorists. They don't need to be convinced of math proofs because that part was never the stumbling point.
BookmarkSaver 11y ago
There are ways to make perfectly secure (from a mathematical standpoint) backdoors. Theoretically, there is no reason that every encryption couldn't have a second key known to the government that doesn't weaken the encryption by any significant standard. The problem is about trusting the government, which can mean (at least) two things. Either you don't trust them to use the key properly. Which is a valid concern. Or you don't trust them to keep their official backdoor key secure. Which is also valid, secure data is stolen all the time and we can't even be sure that they'd notice or admit if it did get stolen. Again, the technical challenge here is that in the real world keys can be stolen. The "system" can be secure from non-government actors even if the system comes installed with a backdoor that the government has access to. The weakness isn't in the theoretical "system", it is in the fact that now instead of one point of weakness (you yourself protecting your own key) there are two real-world points of weakness (your key and the government's key). The "system" is still impregnable to the same types of attacks, but now rather than tricking you out of your key someone might be able to trick the government out of theirs too.
- slg 11y ago
  Now hypothetically, what if you divide the "government key" in half. Give half of that key to the vendor controlling the encryption and half to the legal system. As long as you don't restrict the company from speaking out about its cooperation, that would seeming prevent abuse as well as minimize damage if one key leaked.

by jasode 11y ago

slg 11y ago

I think you just proved my point of why no one is changing their mind on this issue. You went from saying you had a trivial mathematical argument to debating semantics and disagreeing on the meaning of the word "angel". Politicians thrive on those type of semantic arguments. If you want to change their minds, you have to get better at explaining that mathematical argument more convincingly than this video did or you did in your first post.

jasode 11y ago
>You went from ... I went from Math to Semantics because I was engaging with your points specifically... and you mentioned the technology angle because... CodeGrey mentioned it in the video. I wasn't making a universal treatise about government backdoors such that anyone from anti-vaccination parents to moon landing deniers will be convinced of the merits. The technology impossibility of digital locks used by angels-vs-demons mentioned by CodeGrey is a red herring and not really part of the debate that I've heard. Instead, people like Obama/FBI/NSA already know that a backdoor provided to the government is impossible to keep out of criminals' hands. They knowingly avoid mentioning the misuse by criminals and only highlight the benefits of catching terrorists. They don't need to be convinced of math proofs because that part was never the stumbling point.

BookmarkSaver 11y ago

There are ways to make perfectly secure (from a mathematical standpoint) backdoors. Theoretically, there is no reason that every encryption couldn't have a second key known to the government that doesn't weaken the encryption by any significant standard. The problem is about trusting the government, which can mean (at least) two things. Either you don't trust them to use the key properly. Which is a valid concern. Or you don't trust them to keep their official backdoor key secure. Which is also valid, secure data is stolen all the time and we can't even be sure that they'd notice or admit if it did get stolen. Again, the technical challenge here is that in the real world keys can be stolen. The "system" can be secure from non-government actors even if the system comes installed with a backdoor that the government has access to. The weakness isn't in the theoretical "system", it is in the fact that now instead of one point of weakness (you yourself protecting your own key) there are two real-world points of weakness (your key and the government's key). The "system" is still impregnable to the same types of attacks, but now rather than tricking you out of your key someone might be able to trick the government out of theirs too.

slg 11y ago
Now hypothetically, what if you divide the "government key" in half. Give half of that key to the vendor controlling the encryption and half to the legal system. As long as you don't restrict the company from speaking out about its cooperation, that would seeming prevent abuse as well as minimize damage if one key leaked.