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Respectfully, I disagree WRT SSH/TLS Section 2 (4) spells it out: communication service and software providers. That's the maker of every app on your phone, th

Respectfully, I disagree WRT SSH/TLS Section 2 (4) spells it out: communication service and software providers. That's the maker of every app on your phone, the phone manufacturer, your phone company, emails provider, retailer (they're communicating your data to their data warehouses). The summary clearly says "software manufacturers" (aside: manufacture software? facepalm), "providers of wire...electronic...[or] remote communications services, or any person that provides a product or method to facilitate a communication or to process or store data" are all "covered entities" and that they're responsible when they or "another party on their behalf" have made data unintelligible. The bill, in section 3 (c) includes "license distributors", e.g. thr App Store and Google Play. Now that I've typed all that out, and please pardon the profanity, but: What. The. Actual. Fuck. "No one is above the law", except clearly the legislators and enforcers themselves. "Protect ... Privacy with strong data security", which doesn't exist with the sort of recovery mechanism the bill would require. If the data is made intelligible again by a party other than the person who uttered it and their intended recipient, it has, by definition, been breached. You've been pwned. Game over. Full stop. You've lost control of your data. (Edit: clarity)

deleted 11y ago
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ewindisch 11y ago
It would cover your use of SSH/TLS for providing a service, but they can already subpoena those keys under existing law, so it's of limited relevance in a conversation about what this bill introduces. What changes here is that if you deployed SSH/TLS using a HSM (Hardware security module), you'd need to be prepared to provide a plaintext stream upon a court order. Obviously, the alternative is to choose the non-HSM route which is, and has always been, vulnerable to subpoena. I would say the HSM example is likely the government's understanding of the law as it exists today anyway. This is a matter of codifying and clarifying that position. All of the above-such systems are such where the vendor or operator already controls the means and mechanisms for encryption and decryption. These are already vulnerable to subpoena. The serious changes in this bill are around building systems where only the end-user can control access to their data.
- cesarb 11y ago
  > What changes here is that if you deployed SSH/TLS using a HSM (Hardware security module), you'd need to be prepared to provide a plaintext stream upon a court order. Obviously, the alternative is to choose the non-HSM route which is, and has always been, vulnerable to subpoena. Forgive me if I'm wrong, but doesn't SSH always use a Diffie-Hellman key agreement, where the keys are destroyed after their use? No subpoena has the power to recover keys destroyed in the past, even if no HSM had been used. The same applies to modern TLS using DHE or ECDHE suites, and AFAIK the current TLS 1.3 proposal allows only these suites. They might be able to subpoena the authentication keys, but these are useless to recover the ephemeral keys of past connections (except from older TLS cipher suites which didn't use DHE/ECDHE), and even for future connections they would have to be used with an active attack.
  - ewindisch 11y ago
    I hadn't considered DH, but if this bill would be used as basis for a court order to decrypt data obtained via a wiretap, then yes, it would be problematic for PFS cryptosystems. :(
codys 11y ago
> aside: manufacture software? facepalm This is likely to make it less obviously a 1st-amendment issue. Saying "authors of software" makes it a fairly obvious restraint of speech.
- Jtsummers 11y ago
  Also, the government tends to separate out makers (manufacturers) from sellers (vendors), though they could be the same entity. Someone may be able to sell software (say on the Google Play Store or Steam or Apple's App Store), without restrictions. But the makers of the software would be subject to this law if their applications permitted or enabled encrypted communication.

deleted 11y ago

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ewindisch 11y ago

It would cover your use of SSH/TLS for providing a service, but they can already subpoena those keys under existing law, so it's of limited relevance in a conversation about what this bill introduces. What changes here is that if you deployed SSH/TLS using a HSM (Hardware security module), you'd need to be prepared to provide a plaintext stream upon a court order. Obviously, the alternative is to choose the non-HSM route which is, and has always been, vulnerable to subpoena. I would say the HSM example is likely the government's understanding of the law as it exists today anyway. This is a matter of codifying and clarifying that position. All of the above-such systems are such where the vendor or operator already controls the means and mechanisms for encryption and decryption. These are already vulnerable to subpoena. The serious changes in this bill are around building systems where only the end-user can control access to their data.

cesarb 11y ago
> What changes here is that if you deployed SSH/TLS using a HSM (Hardware security module), you'd need to be prepared to provide a plaintext stream upon a court order. Obviously, the alternative is to choose the non-HSM route which is, and has always been, vulnerable to subpoena. Forgive me if I'm wrong, but doesn't SSH always use a Diffie-Hellman key agreement, where the keys are destroyed after their use? No subpoena has the power to recover keys destroyed in the past, even if no HSM had been used. The same applies to modern TLS using DHE or ECDHE suites, and AFAIK the current TLS 1.3 proposal allows only these suites. They might be able to subpoena the authentication keys, but these are useless to recover the ephemeral keys of past connections (except from older TLS cipher suites which didn't use DHE/ECDHE), and even for future connections they would have to be used with an active attack.
- ewindisch 11y ago
  I hadn't considered DH, but if this bill would be used as basis for a court order to decrypt data obtained via a wiretap, then yes, it would be problematic for PFS cryptosystems. :(

codys 11y ago

> aside: manufacture software? facepalm This is likely to make it less obviously a 1st-amendment issue. Saying "authors of software" makes it a fairly obvious restraint of speech.

Jtsummers 11y ago
Also, the government tends to separate out makers (manufacturers) from sellers (vendors), though they could be the same entity. Someone may be able to sell software (say on the Google Play Store or Steam or Apple's App Store), without restrictions. But the makers of the software would be subject to this law if their applications permitted or enabled encrypted communication.