7 ms·
Badlock vulnerability disclosed
- CiPHPerCoder 11y agoLet this be the death knell of the "named vulnerability" sensation. Please.
- michaelbuckbee 11y agoThe naming / marketing of the vulns helps get the word out about the vulnerability. However, it's definitely something that should be reserved for those vulns that affect a larger number of systems severely.
- namtrac 11y agoNot really anymore: http://techcrunch.com/2016/04/11/hyping-vulnerabilities-is-no-longer-helping-application-security-awareness/ http://techcrunch.com/2016/04/11/hyping-vulnerabilities-is-n...
- geoelectric 11y agoI think the value of the name is in making it easy to talk about that particular type of vulnerability as an atomic concept, just like naming everywhere else in computers. I'm not sure there needs to be a bright line on impact for that--if it's impactful enough to talk about, giving it a name makes sense. The hype comes from people not understanding the impact, pure and simple, and overinflating it as it gets passed around. The name just makes it easier to pass around in the process. A good solution would attack the understanding of impact part of it--maybe a severity rating system like we have for tornados, earthquakes, or other catastrophic disasters?--not so much the naming. Making it easy to talk about is great, as long as we make it easy to talk about accurately.
- CiPHPerCoder 11y agoWhile that can be true, greedy idiots are going to use the hype machine to increase their revenue. I have a vuln I was considering naming, but after BadLock I'm strongly reconsidering it.
- jra_samba 11y agoWell then some good has come of it :-).
- 0x0 11y agoIs it just me or is this really not all that exciting? Some NTLM MITM and downgrade stuff mostly, hasn't that family of protocols always had those issues? From all the pre-announcement hype I'd expected at least something on the level of unauthenticated remote root over UDP :P Also this web site seems to be overloaded, and there's not even any links to the relevant MS16-0xx patches. Not so impressive :(
- creshal 11y ago> Is it just me or is this really not all that exciting? Hmm, let's recap: 0. Samba has, for years, been a pure clusterfuck to compile and build yourself, attempts at getting community help from the mailing list are always deflected with "don't do that, use SerNet's binaries". Distribution packages as well are not supported by the Samba community, it's SerNet or GTFO. 1. SerNet stops distributing precompiled Samba binaries for free. Thus, users are forced to either buy absurdly expensive "samba+" licenses (250€/server/year!) or to stick to distribution packages, which are still at 4.1. 2. Samba, led by SerNet, stops supporting 4.1. 3. Samba announces "Badlock" _several weeks_ in advance and helpfully points out that, since 4.1 reached EOL a week earlier, users will have to upgrade to versions that are only available from source or as paid SerNet binaries. I'm sure there's absolutely no malicious intent behind this whole ridiculous charade.
- 0x0 11y agoThis is the first time I recall hearing about SerNet. What is this, some kind of sell-out or hostile takeover? I always thought samba was created by "that rsync guy" and a team of nice open source maintainers. I had no idea.
- creshal 11y agoIt seems that SerNet provides a huge chunk (the majority?) of the manpower behind Samba, and has thus considerable influence in organizing the project.
- jra_samba 11y agoUnofficial back-ports are being attached to the bug report all the way back to 3.0.x. Red Hat, SuSE and others have donated engineering time and resources to review and create these back ports. All vendors will be preparing patches for all supported versions. Microsoft is also patching the same vulnerability. This is a large coordinated effort. Expect patches from other non-Samba using vendors shortly.
- nix0n 11y agoHere's the Google cache version: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ZKTmHGzZ48gJ:badlock.org/ http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ZKTmHGz... I didn't read closely but it seems to be mostly MITM
- Analemma_ 11y agoUgh. Never have I gone so fast from "this is a great idea!" to "this is a fucking terrible idea" as I have with named/marketed vulnerabilities. Heartbleed was a perfect usage because it really was ultra-critical: the patch needed to be applied ASAP and people really did need to STOP signing into servers until it was fixed, and then generate new keys afterward. But now it has become cheap marketing for infosec hucksters trying to get attention for their crappy firm, and used on bugs that are really no big deal. Stop, stop, for the love of god please stop. You're making things worse.
- rmetzler 11y agoI understand what you want to say, but you have to see this in the context of crypto lockers. I think it's a very realistic scenario that an attacker hacks into a router and then uses this position to encrypt the SAMBA Server in a MITM attack.
- pfg 11y agoHaving access to the internal network is a "game over" scenario for 95% of real-world networks. I'm not sure if anyone would even attempt to use something as elaborate as MitM in a crypto locker, when they could most likely just throw a random exploit kit at the network and be done with it in the majority of cases. Not to say people shouldn't fix this, but this was extremely overhyped.
- jra_samba 11y agoI dunno, but things seem to be getting worse. I remember when it used to be "Have physical access to the local machine, then it's game over". After a while it became "Have remote shell access to the machine, then it's game over". Have we really come to the point where it's now "Having access to the internal network is a 'game over' scenario for 95% of real-world networks" ? WTF is happening to our security ?
- tptacek 11y agoYes. Yes, we really have. Yes. On a network large enough to have an important AD DC, internal network access is always game-over. Some of our largest and savviest clients would pay us to do "internal network penetration tests". Despite these clients having huge security teams and despite internal network security being so important to them that they'd actually spend consultant dollars to test it, those projects were invariably a bonanza for the testers. I think this explains some of the reaction on Twitter from software security people: if you've done consulting work, you already assumed these networks were totally insecure.
- dsp1234 11y agoNote that there are still several high impact vulnerabilities released today: Hyper-v guest escape[0] Local privilege escalations[1][2] DOS for IIS/http.sys[3] Also, there is a different MitM that allows dumping the SAM database[4] [0] - https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS16-045 https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS16-045 [1] - https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS16-046 https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS16-046 [2] - https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS16-048 https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS16-048 [3] - https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS16-049 https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS16-049 [4] - https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS16-047 https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS16-047
- runesoerensen 11y agoBetter link: http://badlock.org http://badlock.org (https version doesn't seem to work)
- tptacek 11y agoJust for those of you who don't keep abreast of vulnerability research: the overwhelming hot-take response to Badlock is that this is a candidate for the most over-hyped vulnerability of the year, and that the underlying issue (that SMB was pervasively vulnerable to MITM) is well-known already..
- jra_samba 11y agoIt's not SMB. It's nothing to do with SMB. Please read the vulnerability disclosures.
- raesene9 11y agoso if I'm reading it correctly it's a downgrade attack where the attacker can MitM a connection? If so, I'm struggling to not agree that this has been overhyped a lot.
- jra_samba 11y agoI'm ambivalent towards the hype. The web site is nothing to do with the Samba Team. Having said that, this is an important enough bug that lots of vendors need to patch immediately, and the website really helped let them know that they needed to address this as soon as possible. Could it have been handled better ? Maybe, but you get back to me after you've coordinated security disclosure for 15+ major product vendors and give me some tips :-).
- raesene9 11y agoSorry I must have missed the bit where I impuned the rollout of the issue, or suggested I could have done it better? My comment related to the hype surrounding this bug, which I see (from an infosec point) as a bad thing. From https://www.samba.org/samba/history/security.html https://www.samba.org/samba/history/security.html it looks like there were 8 CVEs for bugs in samba this month and 14 in Microsoft's monthly patch bulletin (https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ms16-apr https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ms16-apr) Should all of those have logos and websites...? Do the other issues in these releases not need to be fixed...? So why is it a bad thing? Well to me it contributes to "vulnerability fatigue". the more issues that get hyped up and then don't turn out to be objectively more serious than many other issues that are getting release, the more people will dismiss efforts to draw attention to issues that come up.
- cmdrfred 11y agoso some sort of pass the hash all over again?
- orf 11y agoOver-hyped. Nobody in their right mind would expose a SMB share to the public net which mitigates the exploits a bit, and for #1 SMB servers have a long history with MITM issues. Yes they are bad and people should patch, but did it really need such a build up, and how did the build up help?
- jra_samba 11y agoRead the disclosures. It's not SMB. It's nothing to do with SMB. It's your AD-DC that is at risk here.
- tptacek 11y agoIt's not SMB, but it's all DCE RPC, right?
- jra_samba 11y agoYes that's correct. But DCE RPC is used for control of all AD-DC instances. That's why it's rated important.
- orf 11y agoI have, and I didn't say it had anything to do with it. The point is it's hardly a heartbleed or even a shellshock. Having samba accessible from the public internet is a issue in itself, regardless of this exploit. The MITM is dangerous I guess, but it's a MITM. It's bad, but not super-hypetrain mega-branding bad. It's not colleagues talking about it at lunch bad. Plus all the shady stuff other people have commented on here. Edit: having re-read the release ok, yeah, it's pretty bad. I still think you overdid it on the release though.
- jra_samba 11y agoI can't disagree. But I (and the Samba Team) didn't create the website or do the hype.
- jlgaddis 11y ago