3. What are the barriers to entry? The barriers to entry are primarily intellectual. I've never heard of this idea before. Most people (including economists

3. What are the barriers to entry? The barriers to entry are primarily intellectual. I've never heard of this idea before. Most people (including economists and politicians) would balk at the suggestion that the United States could fund a basic income through perpetual deficit spending. People tend to think of basic income only as a way to address social welfare. I see it as a fundamental source of economic stability. Once people see Gresham Dollar succeeding, they may create their own Gresham Dollar Type (GDT) currency. There's no reason why all the various GDTs wouldn't coexist in synergy. Why doesn't _everyone_ start such a service? An "I'm creating my own money, care to join" venture is fine and dandy, but one thing a currency sovereign enjoys is, well, currency sovereignity. And in particular, legal tender status. Gresham Dollar is not an "I'm creating my own money, care to join?" venture. It's an "I'm giving away free money in the form of IOUs for USD that you can spend before they become USD, do you want some?" venture. We piggyback on the currency sovereignity of USD. We're backing ourselves against an existing currency, which is what central banks do. I actually came up with this idea last year when I was pondering a possible Greek exit from the eurozone. I asked myself what would happen if the Bank of Greece tried to re-introduce the drachma. With too few capital controls, they'd have trouble stemming a currency run that would deplete their reserve of euros thus collapsing the drachma/euro exchange rate. With too many capital controls, they'd have trouble enforcing an official exchange rate. So I asked myself what would be the smoothest way for a country like Greece, who's mostly out of money, to introduce a new currency? The answer I came up with was for the central bank to forgo on-demand currency exchange in favor of a kind of timer on new drachma that automatically converted it into euros when it expired. But the trick would be every time the new drachma get spent, the timer on it would reset. Thus the more the new drachma circulated, the less the Bank of Greece would dip into its euro reserves. Furthermore, the less people trust the new drachma, the more likely they are to try to get rid of it. If a Greek citizen has euros in one hand and drachma in the other, he will spend the new drachma first, thus keeping it alive.