Reading through the bill, it's apparent that this is actually a pretty poor attempt at circumventing the rise of encryption. I have my suspicions as to why. Th

Reading through the bill, it's apparent that this is actually a pretty poor attempt at circumventing the rise of encryption. I have my suspicions as to why. The bill mandates technical assistance, yes, but the obvious argument is that no amount of technical assistance can accomplish that which is impossible. If the data can't be accessed, it can't be accessed. Interpreting this as barring companies from implementing those implementing those features would require an unduly expansive reading of the text, to say nothing of issues with Sect. 3(b). Sect. 3(c) seems to contradict that, but 18 USC § 2711 defines a "remote computing service" as "the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system" [0]. That would seem to include iCloud services, for instance, but not the iPhone itself. For reference, 18 USC Chapter 121 covers the storage of electronic communications and access to transactional records. It's possible that this is part of a long-game. Breaking the encryption debate down into smaller pieces lets them control the narrative a bit more and defuse some of the strongest arguments against backdoors and weakening encryption. They can point to this bill a few months down the road and see "look, nothing bad happened. The evil hackers those San Francisco techies were complaining about never stole your identity." It would make the opposition appear more reactionary, and give them more time to muddy the water further. To the average person, the bill seems entirely reasonable. Who could object to companies giving assistance when they have to comply with a court order? In that sense, it's a perfect starting point. But most likely, this is a trial balloon meant to help them refine their arguments and position before they get around to a concerted push. That seems likely given that the Senate Intelligence Committee doesn't really have jurisdiction over this issue [1][2]. If they can pass it, great for them. If not, they'll come back around for another go in a bit. They've got the time, and for various reasons, they've chosen this hill to fight upon. If the want to stop these efforts before they eventually manage to stumble into a "success," the tech industry eventually has to gear up for a lobbying and PR war with a degree of cynicism that's unheard of in Silicon Valley. Eventually, simply reacting to the government's efforts isn't going to be enough. Groups like the RIAA and MPAA, even when they've failed to actually implement their policy proposals, have had remarkable successes in manipulating Congress to go along with their plans. At least until they backfire. Like the NRA with the second amendment, encryption will have to be the primary focus. Everything else has to be secondary. Supporting backdoors and the weakening of encryption has to be transformed into a toxic issue for politicians. Hammer home the potential consequences to every retiree and everyone else who doesn't like the idea of their identity being stolen and their assets being spread amongst the criminal element. With this debate, there's really no room for optimism or taking the "high road." There's no high road in sight, and success is the only metric that matters here. 0. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2711 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2711 1. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/burr-feinstein-proposal-simply-anti-security https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/burr-feinstein-proposa... 2. http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/about http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/about