That assumes that you verify the contents of EVERY commit since the last tag, when you sign a new tag. NO ONE i know does this. Conversely, everyone expects to

That assumes that you verify the contents of EVERY commit since the last tag, when you sign a new tag. NO ONE i know does this. Conversely, everyone expects to be held, and hold others, accountable for the contents of their commits. We don't have second preimage attacks on sha1 yet, but thinking of keeping signatures separates only buys you flexibility (which is not used by most projects currently on github) and maybe a bit of performance, for a process that is much more brittle. Also, with things like this: > It also doesn't add any real value, since the way the git DAG-chain of SHA1's work, you only ever need _one_ signature to make all the commits reachable from that one be effectively covered by that one. He completely misses the point: who's going to check after pulling that the whole history of dozen/hundreds of commits is legit? That might be the case for the Linux kernel gatekeeper, but not for one of the several small contributors to any project. Let's not do some "appeal to authority" BS with a myopic post from 7 years ago.