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I'm not so sure that contributions would be welcome. When I've come up against limitations, and go search through the mailing lists to see what's been done, I f
by epistasis 11y ago
I'm not so sure that contributions would be welcome. When I've come up against limitations, and go search through the mailing lists to see what's been done, I find that ideas and code have been rejected.
I have a key fob that performs cryptographic operations. Rather than use existing standards, GnuPG demands full control of the fob, making it impossible to use the same device for client certs on browsers, or for the VPN, etc. There are some barely maintained shims that get around some of these design flaws, but it's an extremely hassle to find the shims and to get them working.
GnuPG's agent also makes it quite difficult to use git remotely. Most of the code I write is on remote servers, setting up an agent to allow forwarded operations.
I think that it's time to move on from GPG, or fork it, or something. There's not much in GPG's implementation of PGP that I like.
- lmm 11y ago> I think that it's time to move on from GPG, or fork it, or something. There's not much in GPG's implementation of PGP that I like. It's the only mature implementation of the relevant standards (at least now that RSA inc. has demonstrated its nontrustworthiness). I've never known anyone have a bad word to say about the actual cryptography (and notably it seems to have been effective for e.g. Snowden). By all means improve the agents and the integrations, and fork it if you think that will help. But keep the OpenPGP standard and keep the proven cryptography implementation. That part is worth its weight in gold.