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As much as I like this, I'm refusing to use Signal for Moxie's[1] stance on requiring access to the address book on iOS [2]. Regretfully I'm not skilled enough
by smartbit 11y ago
As much as I like this, I'm refusing to use Signal for Moxie's[1] stance on requiring access to the address book on iOS [2].
Regretfully I'm not skilled enough to modify the code and create a branch.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11288169 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11288169
[2] https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-iOS/search?utf8=&q=ADDRESSBOOK_RESTRICTED_ALERT_BODY https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-iOS/search?utf8=&q=...
- simoncion 11y agoOddly, the Android version seems to work just fine if it doesn't have access to your contacts. (Like -ferinstance- if you use Cyanogenmod's Privacy Guard stuff to deny access.) I don't know, but I've heard Internet Rumors that OWS has been having difficulty finding folks to work on the iOS version of Signal. Not that you asked for it, but my stance on the read-contacts issue is this: if I can't trust OWS to treat the contacts information that the Signal client transfers to their server as confidential, then I sure as fuck can't trust them to actually resist the urge to subvert either their client or their server code (whether for financial gain, or because someone with a gun comes knocking). Given that I trust OWS to act with integrity, I don't see any significant harm in how they currently handle contact data.
- nucleardog 11y agoCM's privacy guard doesn't deny access to the contacts, it returns a valid address book listing... just an empty one instead of your real contacts. Privacy Guard was implemented well before the idea of individual permissions being denied made its way into the Android base, so most apps were not implemented with this expectation and would explode completely if the call to fetch the address book entries failed. Which is just to say that that's not really a valid comparison.
- simoncion 11y ago> CM's privacy guard doesn't deny access to the contacts, it returns a valid address book listing... just an empty one instead of your real contacts. ... Which is just to say that that's not really a valid comparison. Wot? It's totally a valid comparison. The problem is transmission of contact information from your phone to a third party. Telling Signal that you have an empty contact list solves that problem, and it solves it far better than just throwing a permissions error or whatever when the software goes to request a contacts list.
- nucleardog 11y ago> Oddly, the Android version seems to work just fine if it doesn't have access to your contacts. You're specifically calling out CM's Privacy Guard where the app is unaware that it doesn't have access to your contacts. the difference in behaviour between "Android" and iOS is not "odd" because it's not a 1:1 comparison, and the CM way of doing it specifically mitigates the issue that arises. A consistent comparison would be seeing what the app does when permission is denied via the runtime permissions in Android 6, because that - like iOS - informs the app that you've denied permission. There is no obvious incongruity between the apps here.
- simoncion 11y ago> A consistent comparison would be... Ah! I see what you're saying (and the source of your objection) now. Thanks for clarifying!
- Freak_NL 11y agoThe requirement of a mobile phone number and either Android or IOS, or a linked instance of one of those seems even more restrictive for a tool that claims to be all about privacy. The way governments are rapidly closing up methods to register a mobile phone number without ID are disconcerting, although predictable due to the common use of burner phones as communication device of choice for nefarious purposes.
- Freak_NL 11y agoI do understand this choice when judging Signal purely as a replacement for WhatsApp etc., but even then I wouldn't design a protocol based on the requirement of a mobile phone number and one of the two dominant mobile operating systems (and thus a smartphone).
- 05 11y agoBranching won't help because you won't be able to replicate their bundle ID when signing, so no push notifications.. A jailbreak tweak seems more appropriate Current version needs an SMS to activate, so unless you use a throwaway SIM you're compromised anyway. The proper solution is to have own app communicate with your own server with and have that server use a proper Tor-routed IM protocol that actually conceals metadata like your contacts' identities