There was outright fraud by some Iceland bankers, who indicated they had assets and relationships that did not exist. Issues include: - Indicating to the ECB

There was outright fraud by some Iceland bankers, who indicated they had assets and relationships that did not exist. Issues include: - Indicating to the ECB and others that they had relationships with strong German banks (when the Iceland bankers showed up at the German banks, the Germans indicated they had never heard of the Iceland banks) - Engaging in "next-gen Enron-style" corporate asset-liability accounting deceit, such as counting zero-coupon bonds cross-issued with other banks as assets but not as liabilities - Knowingly accepting billions in bailout funds from the ECB on said fraud - Failing to acknowledge, take steps to prevent or mitigate damage, at the point when it was undeniable that Icelandic banks could never cover their liabilities - Paying their executives on quarterly bonuses in spite of horrific losses That's just a glossy sampling. If it's an interesting topic for you, I strongly recommend the book by my friend Gudrun Johnson, "Bringing Down the Banking System: Lessons from Iceland". The Report of the Althingy (Icelandic parliament) is one of the most exceptional pieces of literature of our generation (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Report_of_the_Investigation_Commission_of_Althing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Report_of_the_Investigatio...). It is the source on which Gudrun based her book, and arguably the best post-mortem on an insolvency ever made, or at least since the Amulree Royal Commission on the insolvency of the Dominion of Newfoundland. EDIT Fixed list.