7 ms·

Serious question: how is this "unlocking iPhone case", any different from what fbi and other agencies used to do for a while when they seize computers for examp

by usaphp 11y ago

Serious question: how is this "unlocking iPhone case", any different from what fbi and other agencies used to do for a while when they seize computers for example, or a locked safe? They also "unlocked" those devices after they got a warrant, what makes this "iPhone case" any different? If they have a warrant - and a way to unlock the device - what is the reason of all this buzz around it?

deleted 11y ago
[deleted]
einarvollset 11y ago
I think because Apple decided, after the Snowden illegal wiretapping stories, to grandstand for PR purposes. And many tech writers took that bait.
- Gustomaximus 11y ago
  That's really not a fair summary of the situation. Apple took a stand, rightly in my view, to dig their heels in under the request to make a permanent back door for FBI (and likely other groups) usage. There is a massive difference.
  - einarvollset 11y ago
    I respect that view. Here's where I disagree: I think Apple taking a similar stand for the illegal wiretapping makes sense (giant open door, no court oversight), but not for this case (could be clean roomed, court oversight)
    - swyman 11y ago
      Is a company that makes safes legally required to have a master key or to create a master key even when they don't want to? The question is whether or not a 3rd party can be compelled to create something which does not exist in order to aid in the execution of a search warrant. I think it's pretty clear based on prior All Writs Act precedent[1] that Apple should not be required to produce new software code for cases like this. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._New_York_Telephone_Co.#Opinion_of_the_Court https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._New_York_Tele...
      - duaneb 11y ago
        I think there's a strong case for first-amendment rights in code signing even in the case of a non-ephemeral signing key. In any case, look at the use of a search warrant with Lavabit—is it clear that the All Writs act was even their strongest legal suit?
  - riquito 11y ago
    > That's really not a fair summary of the situation. Apple took a stand, rightly in my view, to dig their heels in under the request to make a permanent back door for FBI (and likely other groups) usage. There is a massive difference This is history rewriting, the request, in his least dangerous form, was to unlock a single phone from inside Apple labs by Apple people
    - mk4p 11y ago
      Incorrect -- they requested an "instrument", which carries with it all sorts of legal requirements beyond creating an in-house tool. Source: http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5645 http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5645
      - daxfohl 11y ago
        They made both requests. Apple refused both requests.
- crocowhile 11y ago
  yes, perhaps Apple is doing the right thing for the wrong reason. I also think so. However, it's still the right thing and therefore i support them. Even EFF supports them.
  - eridius 11y ago
    Why do you think they're doing it for the wrong reason? Apple has demonstrated many times their commitment to user privacy, it's not like this was a PR stunt.
superuser2 11y ago
It is interesting that they have a way to unlock the device, both because it means iPhones are less secure than we thought and because it contradicts their earlier position that they needed Apple to disable security features for them to access a locked device.
icebraining 11y ago
The issue is not that they're trying to unlock it, but that they're trying to force the manufacturer to unlock it for them.
pjc50 11y ago
Computers are rarely found with full-disk encryption. When Ross Ulbricht was arrested he did have his laptop encrypted, but the FBI went to great lengths to arrest him at a cafe when he had it open, on, and unlocked. Normally computer forensics just consists of making an image of the unencrypted disk. Microsoft Bitlocker defaults to asking you to save a recovery key in the cloud where it can be subpoena'd. Apple is unique in offering high-security by default devices to the general public - although the security is part of their product strategy of keeping complete control of the platform. Safes are drillable, and there may also be "password recovery" services available from the manufacturer.
- nxzero 11y ago
  >> "security is part of [Apple's] product strategy of keeping complete control of the platform" ^^ True, which is why Apple's systems and related security measures will likely never be publicly auditable.
  - merpnderp 11y ago
    On the other hand, it makes exploits very valuable to the FBI where they will likely be saved for high profile cases. I can't tell if this is a good or bad thing.
    - nxzero 11y ago
      It's neither good or bad, but a reflection of how complex real security is, that being perfectly secure is likely impossible, etc.
sickbeard 11y ago
nobody answered your question because there is no difference.
- pjc50 11y ago
  Unlocking a safe unlocks that safe. The proposed FBI exploit would unlock any and all iPhones.
  - oldmanhorton 11y ago
    A sufficiently powerful drill, which humans have possessed for some time, can unlock any and all safes...

by usaphp 11y ago

deleted 11y ago

[deleted]

einarvollset 11y ago

I think because Apple decided, after the Snowden illegal wiretapping stories, to grandstand for PR purposes. And many tech writers took that bait.

Gustomaximus 11y ago
That's really not a fair summary of the situation. Apple took a stand, rightly in my view, to dig their heels in under the request to make a permanent back door for FBI (and likely other groups) usage. There is a massive difference.
- einarvollset 11y ago
  I respect that view. Here's where I disagree: I think Apple taking a similar stand for the illegal wiretapping makes sense (giant open door, no court oversight), but not for this case (could be clean roomed, court oversight)
  - swyman 11y ago
    Is a company that makes safes legally required to have a master key or to create a master key even when they don't want to? The question is whether or not a 3rd party can be compelled to create something which does not exist in order to aid in the execution of a search warrant. I think it's pretty clear based on prior All Writs Act precedent[1] that Apple should not be required to produce new software code for cases like this. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._New_York_Telephone_Co.#Opinion_of_the_Court https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._New_York_Tele...
    - duaneb 11y ago
      I think there's a strong case for first-amendment rights in code signing even in the case of a non-ephemeral signing key. In any case, look at the use of a search warrant with Lavabit—is it clear that the All Writs act was even their strongest legal suit?
- riquito 11y ago
  > That's really not a fair summary of the situation. Apple took a stand, rightly in my view, to dig their heels in under the request to make a permanent back door for FBI (and likely other groups) usage. There is a massive difference This is history rewriting, the request, in his least dangerous form, was to unlock a single phone from inside Apple labs by Apple people
  - mk4p 11y ago
    Incorrect -- they requested an "instrument", which carries with it all sorts of legal requirements beyond creating an in-house tool. Source: http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5645 http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5645
    - daxfohl 11y ago
      They made both requests. Apple refused both requests.
crocowhile 11y ago
yes, perhaps Apple is doing the right thing for the wrong reason. I also think so. However, it's still the right thing and therefore i support them. Even EFF supports them.
- eridius 11y ago
  Why do you think they're doing it for the wrong reason? Apple has demonstrated many times their commitment to user privacy, it's not like this was a PR stunt.

superuser2 11y ago

It is interesting that they have a way to unlock the device, both because it means iPhones are less secure than we thought and because it contradicts their earlier position that they needed Apple to disable security features for them to access a locked device.

icebraining 11y ago

The issue is not that they're trying to unlock it, but that they're trying to force the manufacturer to unlock it for them.

pjc50 11y ago

Computers are rarely found with full-disk encryption. When Ross Ulbricht was arrested he did have his laptop encrypted, but the FBI went to great lengths to arrest him at a cafe when he had it open, on, and unlocked. Normally computer forensics just consists of making an image of the unencrypted disk. Microsoft Bitlocker defaults to asking you to save a recovery key in the cloud where it can be subpoena'd. Apple is unique in offering high-security by default devices to the general public - although the security is part of their product strategy of keeping complete control of the platform. Safes are drillable, and there may also be "password recovery" services available from the manufacturer.

nxzero 11y ago
>> "security is part of [Apple's] product strategy of keeping complete control of the platform" ^^ True, which is why Apple's systems and related security measures will likely never be publicly auditable.
- merpnderp 11y ago
  On the other hand, it makes exploits very valuable to the FBI where they will likely be saved for high profile cases. I can't tell if this is a good or bad thing.
  - nxzero 11y ago
    It's neither good or bad, but a reflection of how complex real security is, that being perfectly secure is likely impossible, etc.

sickbeard 11y ago

nobody answered your question because there is no difference.

pjc50 11y ago
Unlocking a safe unlocks that safe. The proposed FBI exploit would unlock any and all iPhones.
- oldmanhorton 11y ago
  A sufficiently powerful drill, which humans have possessed for some time, can unlock any and all safes...