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It's just that you made a very specific claim about the nature of environmental risks, that such harms are typically (at their worst) so bad as to be uninsurabl

It's just that you made a very specific claim about the nature of environmental risks, that such harms are typically (at their worst) so bad as to be uninsurable. "typically (at their worst)"? I'm not even sure what you mean by that. (I have some guesses at what you might be getting at, but they also point to things I didn't say, either). In order for the environmental damage of industrial disasters to be that bad (above the ~$1 trillion that a reinsurance network could cover), it would also have to be so bad as to justify banning most classes of industrial activity. (1) I don't agree (nor do I think most people would agree) that all environmental or human disasters have measurable impact (let alone have a dollar value -- even a very high one -- which would suffice to repair or compensate for the loss the incur). (2) The second half of your statement does not follow from the first. Which technique do you think that argument is unhelpfully using? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum

SilasX 11y ago
>"typically (at their worst)"? >I'm not even sure what you mean by that. Then review the original usage, which should have made it clear -- I was distinguishing operations where (I claim) the worst case is insurable from the cases where it isn't. I remarked that the worst case is rarely uninsurable, and gave the example of nuclear operations (which means nuclear power and nuclear weapons). So, typically (across the set of environment-risking things), the worst case (within one of those things) is not beyond the reach of insurance. Sorry if that whole "typical extreme" thing threw you for a loop, but I thought it was clear from context. Let me know if you know of a better way to communicate this concept. You seem to be deeply familiar with these kinds of considerations, so I bet you have one. >(1) I don't agree (nor do I think most people would agree) that all environmental or human disasters have measurable impact (let alone have a dollar value -- even a very high one -- which would suffice to repair or compensate for the loss the incur). Well, then you've inserted infinities in your model, which fundamentally breaks things and renders further debate pointless. The moment you say "this outcome is so bad that it dominates all other outcomes", then even small probabilities of it are unacceptable -- the Pascal's Wager dynamic. But that equally cuts against regulatory approaches, and it's not a reason to favor top-down regulation vs the insurance system advocated in the thread. Generally speaking, the moment you refuse to quantify the damage, it's no longer in the reach of reasonable debate. "This thing is infinitely valuable" makes for nice platitudes, but not sound policy. >Reductio ad absurdum It's valid to point out how someone's claim implies an absurdity they disagree with :-p Certainly, you can dispute that the implication follows, but I'm not sure where you're coming from with a categorical dismissal.
- kafkaesq 11y ago
  So, -typically- (across the set of environment-risking things), the -worst case- (within one of those things) is not beyond the reach of insurance. Right -- I think I've been making it pretty clear, though, that I was referring to high-risk industrial activities, not to average case ones. Generally speaking, the moment you refuse to quantify the damage, it's no longer in the reach of reasonable debate. "This thing is infinitely valuable" makes for nice platitudes, but not sound policy. I disagree; I find that qualitative reasoning can often be quite useful. Especially to avoid the pitfalls of purely quantitative reasons, which can often lead one to either-or arguments (such as you are invoking above), reduction to extremes, or other cul-de-sacs of the mind. In particular, you'll note that I've never used the phrase "infinitely valuable" (or "infinitely bad"), and have in fact specifically eschewed it, despite your repeated attempt to assist the contrary. All I'm referring to, basically, is the fact that some forms of damage are basically irreparable -- which is quite different from saying "the thing is infinitely valuable" (or that wrecking it is "infinitely bad"). In other words, it's a distinction of kind, rather than simply degree. And all I'm saying, policy-wise, is that industrial activities which carry a high enough risk of large-scale, irreparable environmental damage are of a different kind, such that it is no longer reasonable to believe that insurance requirements (or any threat of civil penalties against the corporate entities engaging in them) will provide adequate protection; instead they should banned outright. Like, you know -- drunk driving. I don't see this as an unreasonable position, not does is it (as you would seem to suggest) undermine our axiom systems to such a degree that everything becomes unknowable and all debate becomes pointless. Rather, it's just common sense, qualitative reasoning -- that's all.

SilasX 11y ago

>"typically (at their worst)"? >I'm not even sure what you mean by that. Then review the original usage, which should have made it clear -- I was distinguishing operations where (I claim) the worst case is insurable from the cases where it isn't. I remarked that the worst case is rarely uninsurable, and gave the example of nuclear operations (which means nuclear power and nuclear weapons). So, typically (across the set of environment-risking things), the worst case (within one of those things) is not beyond the reach of insurance. Sorry if that whole "typical extreme" thing threw you for a loop, but I thought it was clear from context. Let me know if you know of a better way to communicate this concept. You seem to be deeply familiar with these kinds of considerations, so I bet you have one. >(1) I don't agree (nor do I think most people would agree) that all environmental or human disasters have measurable impact (let alone have a dollar value -- even a very high one -- which would suffice to repair or compensate for the loss the incur). Well, then you've inserted infinities in your model, which fundamentally breaks things and renders further debate pointless. The moment you say "this outcome is so bad that it dominates all other outcomes", then even small probabilities of it are unacceptable -- the Pascal's Wager dynamic. But that equally cuts against regulatory approaches, and it's not a reason to favor top-down regulation vs the insurance system advocated in the thread. Generally speaking, the moment you refuse to quantify the damage, it's no longer in the reach of reasonable debate. "This thing is infinitely valuable" makes for nice platitudes, but not sound policy. >Reductio ad absurdum It's valid to point out how someone's claim implies an absurdity they disagree with :-p Certainly, you can dispute that the implication follows, but I'm not sure where you're coming from with a categorical dismissal.

kafkaesq 11y ago
So, -typically- (across the set of environment-risking things), the -worst case- (within one of those things) is not beyond the reach of insurance. Right -- I think I've been making it pretty clear, though, that I was referring to high-risk industrial activities, not to average case ones. Generally speaking, the moment you refuse to quantify the damage, it's no longer in the reach of reasonable debate. "This thing is infinitely valuable" makes for nice platitudes, but not sound policy. I disagree; I find that qualitative reasoning can often be quite useful. Especially to avoid the pitfalls of purely quantitative reasons, which can often lead one to either-or arguments (such as you are invoking above), reduction to extremes, or other cul-de-sacs of the mind. In particular, you'll note that I've never used the phrase "infinitely valuable" (or "infinitely bad"), and have in fact specifically eschewed it, despite your repeated attempt to assist the contrary. All I'm referring to, basically, is the fact that some forms of damage are basically irreparable -- which is quite different from saying "the thing is infinitely valuable" (or that wrecking it is "infinitely bad"). In other words, it's a distinction of kind, rather than simply degree. And all I'm saying, policy-wise, is that industrial activities which carry a high enough risk of large-scale, irreparable environmental damage are of a different kind, such that it is no longer reasonable to believe that insurance requirements (or any threat of civil penalties against the corporate entities engaging in them) will provide adequate protection; instead they should banned outright. Like, you know -- drunk driving. I don't see this as an unreasonable position, not does is it (as you would seem to suggest) undermine our axiom systems to such a degree that everything becomes unknowable and all debate becomes pointless. Rather, it's just common sense, qualitative reasoning -- that's all.