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Schneier knows this, and this is a particularly idealistic op-ed, but this is just how the exploit market works and while it would be nice if law enforcement wo
by mortenjorck 11y ago
Schneier knows this, and this is a particularly idealistic op-ed, but this is just how the exploit market works and while it would be nice if law enforcement would take the white-hat road, the hazard here is still vastly better than some kind of legal precedent for requiring backdoors.
The good thing about the exploit market is that it is naturally self-limiting: you don't burn a zero-day on a dragnet; you limit its use to high-value (and ideally court-sanctioned) targets.
- woodman 11y ago> ...you don't burn a zero-day on a dragnet; That depends entirely upon the nature of the vulnerability. Every TLS vulnerability publicly disclosed and then patched comes to mind. The NSA can use that all day long without anybody knowing - see parallel reconstruction.
- jfoster 11y agoThere's a bit of irony to this, too. If Apple had been more cooperative earlier, law enforcement probably would've taken the white hat approach. Apple protected users from the FBI, but is now potentially unable to protect them from organised crime.
- laveur 11y agoThere is absolutely no proof of that. What they where asking for was keys to every lock in the world. It would have given them unprecedented power to do whatever they wanted. Apple did the right thing. Users should always come first especially when privacy is at stake.
- ikeboy 11y agoThey were willing to hand over the phone to Apple and allow all work to take place on Apple premises. How does that affect other phones?
- woodman 11y agoSo have you not heard that this would set a legal precedent? Apple would get pestered until they finally create an automatic gateway for turn key security breaking, not unlike the wiretap portals setup by telecoms - or the frequently abused youtube DMCA mechanisms.
- ikeboy 11y agoIt only sets a precedent that they can give phones to Apple and have them unlock them, as long as it's possible for them to do so. If Apple decides to build a general backdoor and hand it to the government that's entirely their decision.
- woodman 11y ago> It only sets a precedent... Yeah, it "only" sets a precedent that the government can compel a company to reverse all the work put into securing a product, no possible market driven unintended consequences there. > If Apple decides... Classic victim blaming, "decision" is the wrong word to use here. Constant negative reinforcement leads to conditioned responses - not decisions.
- jfoster 11y agoIn fact, it also only sets precedent if they have to legally force Apple to do it. Apple could've used their discretion to comply in this particular case, avoiding courts, and avoiding legal precedents being set.
- jfoster 11y agoIt wouldn't set a legal precedent unless a court ruled on it. It would only have come to that if Apple continued to decline the FBI's request.
- woodman 11y agoAgain, victim blaming. How is that any different from the false choice "We can do this the hard way, or the easy way"? Have you considered what will happen to the number of such requests as devices continue to become more secure?
- ryao 11y agoIf Apple had done as requested, the FBI would not have hired a contractor and we would not know that a contractor capable of this existed.
- jfoster 11y agoThere's a bit of irony to this, too. If Apple had been more cooperative earlier, law enforcement probably would've taken the white hat approach. Apple protected users from the FBI, but is now potentially unable to protect them from organised crime.
- bertil 11y ago> ...you don't burn a zero-day on a dragnet; A for-profit entity shouldn’t. I’m not sure the FBI has the same objectives. If they do, I’m sure Apple would be happy to pay market-prices for that vulnerability.