3 ms·
It would be considerably cheaper to just replicate the ASIC you want to attack in your own silicon. The secure enclave isn't so magic it's just a secondary pro
by dogma1138 11y ago
It would be considerably cheaper to just replicate the ASIC you want to attack in your own silicon.
The secure enclave isn't so magic it's just a secondary processor that handles cryptography it has it's own memory to store variable such as failed attempts.
Attacking the SOC might be more complex and expensive but eventually it's exactly the same as attacking the NAND or any other integrated circuit.
For all we know the NSA could (and most likely does) develop their own in circuit debuggers for common ASIC/SOC's and just dumps what ever unique values the target SOC stores and takes a crack at it.
This also isn't out of the realm of possibilities for companies that specialize in in-circuit emulation, hardware design, and forensics to create as a turn key solution.
- abalone 11y ago> it's exactly the same as attacking the NAND or any other integrated circuit Not really. Secure enclaves have added defenses that NAND does not. They don't have an API that lets you read their embedded secrets, for instance. You can't just hook up a debugger. You'd have to try to get at the state of its transistors with an SEM or something. But additionally some have physical defenses against delayering that will self-destruct their contents in the event of a physical compromise. So while I ultimately agree that a nation-state could potentially craft an attack against a specific design, you're understating the difficulty.
- dogma1138 11y agoHence why I said it was more complex and expensive if you are going to quote some one please do so in full. Additionally NAND doesn't have an "API", NAND mirroring works by desoldering the memory hooking it up to a device and mirroring it to another chip by flagging the mirroring bit. There are other ways to attack hardware, you do not need to get a SEM(or AFM for that matter). Devices that probe transistors on a microscopic level exist in the industry (e.g. http://www.tek.com/sites/tek.com/files/media/document/resources/Probing%20Transistors%20App%20Note.pdf http://www.tek.com/sites/tek.com/files/media/document/resour...), hence the more complex and expensive part.
- abalone 11y agoThe tool you linked to actually requires an SEM. Also, you cannot "desolder" the secure enclave and hook it up to a "mirroring" device. That attack requires the NAND to be encapsulated in a desolder-able memory chip that supports reading out state. Not the case with a secure enclave.
- makomk 11y agoThe NAND is encapsulated in a desolderable memory chip that supports reading out state. There's an anti-replay counter, but supposedly that's just stored in another external NOR flash chip with the Secure Element having no onboard flash storage at all - the process Apple builds their chips on doesn't support on-chip flash memory even if they wanted it.
- abalone 11y agoInteresting. What's your source? Apple's whitepaper suggests otherwise, to my reading: "The device’s unique ID (UID) and a device group ID (GID) are AES 256-bit keys fused (UID) or compiled (GID) into the application processor and Secure Enclave during manufacturing."[1] What this says to me is that while rewritable data storage is indeed kept in regular commodity flash memory chips, it's all encrypted by a unique device-specific key that is somehow burned into the secure enclave. So that one little secret kept inside the enclave would allow it to store everything else off-chip. [1] https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
- makomk 11y agoThat unique device-specific key provides no protection against replay attacks. So in practice, the newer Apple devices don't appear to provide any more protection against an attacker with physical access than the one that the FBI just cracked - they should be able to get everything they were demanding in their warrant without Apple's help on any iPhone.
- colejohnson66 11y agoWe already have self destructing circuits[0], but it requires glass. Not something I'd think Apple would go with. Not to mention just dropping the device the wrong way won't just crack your screen anymore, but destroy your precious data. Not something I'd think the average user would want. Or is there a different piece of tech that can self destruct when tampered with? [0]: http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/214185-new-xerox-parc-processor-can-self-destruct-destroy-cryptographic-keys-on-command http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/214185-new-xerox-parc-pro...
- superuser2 11y ago> just replicate the ASIC you want to attack in your own silicon. That doesn't get you the key stored in the target device. It's not the same as attacking any other integrated circuit, because this one is rigged to blow away its secrets if you try to get instruments/debugging tools inside its enclosure in a way its designers thought of.