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You do run into false dependencies causing needless headaches with dynamic libraries though. There's a vulnerability in hash X in OpenSSL. One (or worse zero)

You do run into false dependencies causing needless headaches with dynamic libraries though. There's a vulnerability in hash X in OpenSSL. One (or worse zero) of my 15 installed applications that depend on OpenSSL actually uses hash X, but in order to upgrade, I have to carefully manage those 15 dependencies. With statically linked dependencies, the hash X code wouldn't be in any of the other binaries and I only update the one (or perhaps don't have to update at all).

raimue 11y ago
What do you mean by managing dependencies? You upgrade to an OpenSSL version that fixes hash X and be done with it? I don't understand your point.
- mikecb 11y ago
  Can't upgrade if the fix was dropping the hash because it's fundamentally flawed.
  - raimue 11y ago
    That would be an ABI incompatible change. These are only allowed when increasing the compatibility version (SONAME). You would immediately notice such a change. For the usual package managers that would even require to create a new package.
- robmccoll 11y ago
  I guess under the assumption of everyone following sane versioning practices, maintaining alias symlinks, and/or really solid package management and compatibility testing, this isn't such an issue. If the system admin was compiling a lot of their own libraries and binaries that don't necessarily follow those best practices, it becomes more of a problem. The system admin doesn't know what functionality in the library is used by each binary and weather or not the upgrade is really necessary. If the binaries are self-contained and statically linked, the maintainer of the actual software can stay abreast of security updates in the libraries that they are using and ship updates only when vulnerabilities affect functionality that they use. The sys-admin then only has to download updated binaries if truly necessary and tracking any dependencies on the end-user system becomes unneeded. Not really arguing that it's a better setup. It does mean that software maintainers have to stay active and on-top of security patches. The complexity is inherent, it's just a matter of shifting it around onto different people.

raimue 11y ago

What do you mean by managing dependencies? You upgrade to an OpenSSL version that fixes hash X and be done with it? I don't understand your point.

mikecb 11y ago
Can't upgrade if the fix was dropping the hash because it's fundamentally flawed.
- raimue 11y ago
  That would be an ABI incompatible change. These are only allowed when increasing the compatibility version (SONAME). You would immediately notice such a change. For the usual package managers that would even require to create a new package.
robmccoll 11y ago
I guess under the assumption of everyone following sane versioning practices, maintaining alias symlinks, and/or really solid package management and compatibility testing, this isn't such an issue. If the system admin was compiling a lot of their own libraries and binaries that don't necessarily follow those best practices, it becomes more of a problem. The system admin doesn't know what functionality in the library is used by each binary and weather or not the upgrade is really necessary. If the binaries are self-contained and statically linked, the maintainer of the actual software can stay abreast of security updates in the libraries that they are using and ship updates only when vulnerabilities affect functionality that they use. The sys-admin then only has to download updated binaries if truly necessary and tracking any dependencies on the end-user system becomes unneeded. Not really arguing that it's a better setup. It does mean that software maintainers have to stay active and on-top of security patches. The complexity is inherent, it's just a matter of shifting it around onto different people.