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Why does it need to be a fractional hint of a reward? There are numerous way a system like this could be set up to incentivize jurors. As for your second point
by jpereira 11y ago
Why does it need to be a fractional hint of a reward? There are numerous way a system like this could be set up to incentivize jurors.
As for your second point the proposed solution for that, as mentioned by varav in another comment, is Schelling Point[1] consensus, as described[2] by Vitalik Buterin.
In essence, you call multiple random assessors, with no knowledge of each other, to respond to your given question, or in this case to pass judgement. They're then rewarded based on how close they are to the "average" or consensus. Augur[3] and Truthcoin/Hivemind[4] use a similar idea, and the former is deployed live.
I don't think there's an automatic or immediately clear solution, but its by no means impossible, and the value added by Ethereum could justify coming up with one.
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focal_point_%28game_theory%29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focal_point_%28game_theory%29
[2]: https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/03/28/schellingcoin-a-minimal-trust-universal-data-feed/ https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/03/28/schellingcoin-a-minimal...
[3]: https://augur.net https://augur.net
[4]: http://bitcoinhivemind.com/ http://bitcoinhivemind.com/
- usrusr 11y agoIf randomly called assessors can decide not to assess, the subset of actual jurors stops being random. The market research industry is battling this problem all the time: it's easy to poll opinion from stay at home moms and retirees, but it's near-impossible to access most high income groups (and the implicit selection within that group that derives from this difficulty will make the results pretty much useless, psst, don't tell their customers). If you incentivize assessors enough to make the rate of non-assessors sufficiently small, you not only make the process very expensive, you also open the door far and wide to non-assessing by not seriously considering the options and selecting one of the "truths" at random. Market research has this pretty much under control because they ask so many questions in one go and random-voters tend to enter subjectively-random values that are quite visible to statistical analysis, but i doubt this could be transferred to conflict resolution, because the requirements for a serious answer are so much higher there. I really doubt that this is solvable, not every problem is a good match for a crows-* solution.
- karl_dot_tech 11y agoGreat points. This is a big selling point of Ethereum that could potentially be fundamentally flawed, so really interesting to consider. I'm curious what you think of using a blockchain as a conflict resolver with a large company on the other end. Essentially, instead of having your average joe resolve the conflict, the user can pick eBay, Amazon, etc. to act as resolver. I realize there is no incentive for established companies to provide this service, but I see it as quite empowering for the consumer and seller so maybe someday people will fight for it. I personally think that if this was to work, it wouldn't be a mom & pop shop providing conflict resolution, instead it would be a large semi-transparent entity like eBay. All blockchain would do is provide a trusted medium for everyone to transact on.
- usrusr 11y agoThe way I understand you (which might be off quite a bit), the natural candidates for that kind of service would not be Amazon or Ebay, it would be insurance companies. "Sorry, I can't do business with you, seems like my conflict resolution provider does not have a peering point with yours" might be part of a perfectly reasonable conversation some day. But are we still looking at problems solved by a blockchain or are we already looking at problems caused by it? Honestly, I think I've lost track at some point.
- arthur_pryor 11y ago"There are numerous way a system like this could be set up to incentivize jurors." i find this statement worrisome on its face. for matters of the legal and/or moral variety, i don't want jurors to have an incentive. i want them to be compelled by law to execute the duties appointed to them by the democracy they participate in. jury duty should not be a financial opportunity. 'They're then rewarded based on how close they are to the "average" or consensus.' similarly, i do not want a juror who's aiming to give the same answer most people would give, which sounds like a perverse sort of guessing game. i want a juror who will consider the evidence and pronounce a judgement based on their understanding of the evidence and the law. i want a juror to have the opportunity to exercise their right to jury nullification. etc. i'm not saying that the current western implementations of democracy and jurisprudence are perfect. but they have at least grappled with a bunch of philosophical questions about what say an individual might have. and while i'm a big believer in the potential of things like the etherium and bitcoin blockchains to make our lives better and to facilitate relationships we couldn't have had before, i'm vary wary of the feeling that these systems by their very existence imply clear well-defined solutions to old political and social problems. that is not the case. the existence of a robust tool does not get you out of having to think philosophically.