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'Anti-authority' is not a well defined label. Independent thought and independent behavior are very different things. And unless your behavior is disruptive o

'Anti-authority' is not a well defined label. Independent thought and independent behavior are very different things. And unless your behavior is disruptive or destructive, generally nobody cares what you think. Iconoclasm is a more specific label: independence of thought, or belief, or convention, without any mention of behavior. Presumably iconoclasts are what Levine is describing as positive examples of anti-authority, AKA mentally healthy folks who just think differently, but don't act on it, or who act on it in constructive ways. But anyone who acts disruptively or destructively also qualifies as anti-authority. So I don't see where Levine draws the line between good and bad forms of anti-authority. Inactive belief is good? Disruptive or violent is bad? He doesn't say.

StanislavPetrov 11y ago
Who decides what is "disruptive"? Is it "bad" to disrupt society if that society is evil and corrupt? Was a German who sought to disrupt the Nazis in Germany mentally ill, or was he rightfully disruptive and anti-authoritarian? The point here is that authority and society have no intrinsic worth. The issue is that those who reject authority and/or society are defined as mentally ill according to the psuedo-science of psychiatry, whether or not that authority and/or society is worthy of rejection.
- randcraw 11y ago
  That sounds like a resounding endorsement for anarchy. :-) Game theorists will certainly disagree with you that there's no value in group cooperation. It's pretty obvious that any group that cooperates is more powerful toward almost any goal than any individual or group that does not cooperate. But the question implied by Levine isn't whether cooperation is "worth" more than uncooperation. He's asking whether authority is always good, and hence, whether anti-authority is necessarily bad, or whether it's often a constructive alternative to group-think and submission, given that everyone is inevitably part of one or more groups and thus is obliged to choose a path: conform, change the rules, or quit the group. Levine's implication is that those who choose not to play by the rules, and disrupt the group destructively, are not necessarily pathological. But I think Levine didn't succeed in making that case. He claimed only that some people are labeled as malefactors strictly because they refuse to conform to norms or authority. He doesn't say what fraction of those cases did so unhelpfully. In fact, I suspect all were disruptive to the group's normal conduct, and most in a destructive way. That's not exactly a strong case for singing out, "Viva la difference!"

StanislavPetrov 11y ago

Who decides what is "disruptive"? Is it "bad" to disrupt society if that society is evil and corrupt? Was a German who sought to disrupt the Nazis in Germany mentally ill, or was he rightfully disruptive and anti-authoritarian? The point here is that authority and society have no intrinsic worth. The issue is that those who reject authority and/or society are defined as mentally ill according to the psuedo-science of psychiatry, whether or not that authority and/or society is worthy of rejection.

randcraw 11y ago
That sounds like a resounding endorsement for anarchy. :-) Game theorists will certainly disagree with you that there's no value in group cooperation. It's pretty obvious that any group that cooperates is more powerful toward almost any goal than any individual or group that does not cooperate. But the question implied by Levine isn't whether cooperation is "worth" more than uncooperation. He's asking whether authority is always good, and hence, whether anti-authority is necessarily bad, or whether it's often a constructive alternative to group-think and submission, given that everyone is inevitably part of one or more groups and thus is obliged to choose a path: conform, change the rules, or quit the group. Levine's implication is that those who choose not to play by the rules, and disrupt the group destructively, are not necessarily pathological. But I think Levine didn't succeed in making that case. He claimed only that some people are labeled as malefactors strictly because they refuse to conform to norms or authority. He doesn't say what fraction of those cases did so unhelpfully. In fact, I suspect all were disruptive to the group's normal conduct, and most in a destructive way. That's not exactly a strong case for singing out, "Viva la difference!"