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IMO the bigger question remains: What activities and innovations are their within logistics-industry that ensure integrity of a shipment en-route? If a shipment
by DyslexicAtheist 11y ago
IMO the bigger question remains: What activities and innovations are their within logistics-industry that ensure integrity of a shipment en-route? If a shipment can be intercepted (without a court order and without the package recipient knowledge) then logistics and freight forwarding technologies have some catching up to do. We learned from the Gemalto hack last year that NSA intercepted a list of SIM card encryption keys presumably due to a weakness in Gemalto's supply chain. There was a similar story with CISCO equipment being tampered with.
It would be incredibly interesting to learn what Gemalto and CISCO have meanwhile managed to come up with in order to tighten their supply chain and ensure their clients they don't receive compromised equipment.
- arca_vorago 11y agoSo I recently learned that registered mail is pretty much the highest quality way to ship anything, with full per-node tracking. This was gleaned after some prodding of some people in a law firm who were discussing shipping woes between fedex, dhl, and certified mail, when someone said "What about red-mail"? I had never heard of red-mail (actually registered mail, called red-mail for the red tags, vs the green certified mail tags), but it was explained to me that at least for some governmental purposes, it is the only acceptable way to ship documents and other things. To me, if I want full "evidence custody chain" style logs of device location, for physical equipment, that would be the way to go. Now, the real question is, how much would you really trust the government mail program vs a NSL or interdiction for implant vs a private company vs a NSL or interdiction for implant. I think there is room for discussion there, but I would tend to side with the government one, because the company will have very little recourse, but the gov entity is likely to be staffed by bone-headed gov employees, who are surprisingly good at bad policy pushback when compared to their private counterparts. Perhaps I'm wrong on that though. Sometimes I find interesting insights into IT by listening to lawyers...
- wang_li 11y agoUnless you have an unsubvertible agent carrying the item, you cannot rely on tracking info. How do you know that the tracking data is actually correct and how do you know that the eight hours it spent sitting in a warehouse in Kentucky weren't eight hours used to install malware?
- nickpsecurity 11y agoU.S.P.S. security is good enough on average that intelligence types have been known to use it for classified information. There's so many envelopes going through that USPS security people mainly look for stuff that really stands out in shape, smell, etc. You blend in, then targeting you requires knowing what's on the envelope. Put a countermeasure on that variable to get a decent bit of transport security.
- schoen 11y ago> then logistics and freight forwarding technologies have some catching up to do Definitely, although an important question is whether they want to solve the problem and are able to solve the problem. (We still don't know how these package interdictions are done -- what induces the packages to be turned over to governments for tampering.)
- nickpsecurity 11y agoHigh-assurance security at B3/A1 protection classes included trusted distribution. Here's what they came up with back then: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/secpubs/rainbow/tg008.txt http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/secpubs/rainbow/tg008.txt Note: Yet another for everyone to remember when you hear someone say the old security certifications were just red tape. Stopping interdiction is just red tape. Haha. Here's a basic set of recommendations for supply chain security that provides at least a start on various aspects: http://www.albint.com/en-us/company/Suppliers%20Documents/Supply%20Chain%20Security%20Recommendations.pdf http://www.albint.com/en-us/company/Suppliers%20Documents/Su... U.S. government is freaking about about what they, err the Chinese, can do. They're implementing their own research with stuff like this: http://www.technology.org/2015/07/09/sandia-tamper-detecting-seal-tough-fool/ http://www.technology.org/2015/07/09/sandia-tamper-detecting... http://www.darpa.mil/program/supply-chain-hardware-integrity-for-electronics-defense http://www.darpa.mil/program/supply-chain-hardware-integrity... Personally, I think being able to print or wire-wrap the electronics yourself can be helpful given they might be able to attack inside the PCB. It's a speculative attack I came up with many, many years ago that I can't remember if anyone has implemented. It would be difficult to detect with some of these internet-of-things style chips implemented w/ minimal packaging. There's a lot to this subfield of IT. Verification of incoming components & manufacturing process with trusted couriers is the baseline, though.