4 ms·
Sounds like NSA's Tailored Access Operations[0], and other equivalent agencies. When you're a big enough target, state actors bring the full force of the state'
by jonathankoren 11y ago
Sounds like NSA's Tailored Access Operations[0], and other equivalent agencies. When you're a big enough target, state actors bring the full force of the state's espionage tools to bear.
[0] http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-the-nsas-secret-elite-hacking-unit-works/ http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-the-nsas-secre...
- samstave 11y agoExactly! How many machines have you purchased in your career? I've purchased THOUSANDS - which of these have been intercepted and compromised? I have no clue.
- Spooky23 11y agoI don't know about spy agency compromise, but I have definately caught suppliers "accidentally" sticking counterfeit memory into devices.
- avn2109 11y ago>> "...which of these have been...compromised...? ~All of them, though likely without bothering to intercept your specific hardware, since you were relatively unimportant. Instead, the breaches were built into commodity hardware far upstream of you, for fully general attacks.
- iam-TJ 11y agoIt occurs to me if the company is that big, or that big of a target, it can manage to collect its servers directly from the manufacturer/supplier rather than rely on a third unrelated party for transportation.
- joering2 11y agoSo what? How do you know Dell/HP/Whoever has not been forced by NSL letters to implement backdoors.
- stcredzero 11y agoHow do we know if whoever doesn't think it's their patriotic duty to do so?
- mirimir 11y agoHistorically, that's been the bigger issue. Or at least, that's what I get from Bamford's books.
- ryao 11y ago> So what? How do you know Dell/HP/Whoever has not been forced by NSL letters to implement backdoors. That is not necessary. Just get the shipping company to redirect the hardware to a facility that flashes the Intel ME with signed malware, reseals it and reships it without the recipient seeing anything different. That way fewer people need to know about it, which decreases the chance of detection: http://www.pcworld.com/article/2083300/report-nsa-intercepts-computer-deliveries-to-plant-spyware.html http://www.pcworld.com/article/2083300/report-nsa-intercepts... https://libreboot.org/faq/#intelme https://libreboot.org/faq/#intelme Not even Intel needs to know if they are compromised successfully, just like Google did not need to know about those fiber taps between their datacenters. That means countries like China that have things being shipped to possible targets can do this too if their hackers gain the necessary secrets.
- privong 11y ago> That is not necessary. Just get the shipping company to redirect the hardware to a facility that flashes the Intel ME with signed malware, reseals it and reships it without the recipient seeing anything different. That way fewer people need to know about it, which decreases the chance of detection: @iam-TJ 's point was in reference to the suggestion that Apple could pick the servers up directly from the manufacturer to avoid the interception while the servers are in the shipping company's hands.
- ryao 11y agoIn that case, the attack would not need much cooperation on the part of the OEM/ODM. The Intel chipsets could be flashed enroute to their manufacturing plant. They might not want the malware to go many places other than the intended target, which is why they would likely want some cooperation to ensure that they only make it to the intended target, which is why I say not much cooperation rather than no cooperation. Anyone from Apple inspecting the factory might not realize it.
- sosborn 11y ago> it can manage to collect its servers directly from the manufacturer/supplier rather than rely on a third unrelated party for transportation. Until it hits customs.
- Spooky23 11y agoOr the Chinese equivalent. Or both.