4 ms·
I think you're right about the mental shortcuts, but the main effect I see at play in the article is about misaligned incentives. It's in the organization's in
by bjt 11y ago
I think you're right about the mental shortcuts, but the main effect I see at play in the article is about misaligned incentives.
It's in the organization's interest to hire the underrated, but it's not in the HR recruiter's interest to do that. If the recruiter refers a candidate who looks good on paper but turns out to be a bad hire, no one's going to blame the recruiter. But every time recruiters have the engineers interview a candidate that's not from a top school or a top company, recruiters risk losing credibility with the engineers if the candidate is rejected or ends up being a bad hire. So recruiters focus on the candidates who are the most defensible, not necessarily those who would make the company the most successful.
- taurath 11y agoI liken this to a government contract seller - nobody will ever get fired for choosing IBM/Microsoft/BigCo as a vendor if it fails, but you certainly can for choosing that small shop that can usually get stuff done faster. Cover Your Ass isn't a good incentive pattern when you're trying to hire engineers, which is hard enough already. At the same time, its really difficult to balance the time. My trick (and I think this is common): interview anyone that comes in on a referral within reason.
- ionforce 11y ago> recruiters risk losing credibility with the engineers if the candidate is rejected or ends up being a bad hire This isn't really a good way of looking at it. It should be more collaborative/problem solving rather than adversarial/blame-based. "YOU didn't get ME the RIGHT candidate."
- morgante 11y agoExactly. Recruiting is ripe with principal agent problems. Recruiters don't get blamed for the undervalued candidates they failed to hire. Nor do they get fired for hiring Stanford grads. (The engineering equivalent of IBM.)