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You're not secure until you whitelist. And even that's not a guarantee; it's a necessary but sufficient condition. But systems which do not run signed, whitelis
by bitwize 11y ago
You're not secure until you whitelist. And even that's not a guarantee; it's a necessary but sufficient condition. But systems which do not run signed, whitelisted code from boot time forward are as good as pwnt.
- catnaroek 11y ago> You're not secure until you whitelist. No, a whitelist isn't good enough. You can't anticipate an exhaustive list of the programs the user will want to run. What you can do, however, is enforce a policy by which programs are required to provide machine-checkable evidence, also known as proof-carrying code [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof-carrying_code https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof-carrying_code], that they respect the system's safety policy. > it's a necessary but sufficient condition Perhaps you mean “not sufficient”?
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- bitwize 11y agoYes, that's what I meant -- not sufficient. Whitelisting seems to be working out well for Apple. It's a big part of why they're the most secure smartphone platform.