3 ms·

Most people don't boot their computers very frequently, and when they do they have a full-sized keyboard at their disposal.

mindslight 11y ago
That's orthogonal to what I said. But to address your implicit point about UI - 64 bits of entropy is 6 diceware words, which seems eminently doable for your casual user wanting casual security. Phones are kept in possession more, and thus need a cold-unlock less frequently. And users are still free to compromise their security by using less entropy, just as they are currently regarding Apple (and likely by extension USG, as is currently being worked out). Also tamper-resistant hardware isn't strictly incompatible with Free software. Imagine a security model that allowed loading of whatever software image, but wiped nonvolatile storage before doing so.
- superuser2 11y ago
  People were annoyed enough by 4 digits that Touch ID was a major selling point. 6 words isn't gonna happen. But you already can use such a password with an iPhone, and if you do, the attack the FBI is attempting won't work. Software freedom doesn't enter into it. What should (and might) happen is Apple's model being amended to also require a code-signing key held by the user, encrypted with the rest of the phone. Apple could do this in its closed-source model, and Free Software wouldn't necessarily do that. Proper security design here really has nothing to do with whether the software is free.
  - mindslight 11y ago
    Surprise surprise, pop culture is based on laziness. Free software generally relies wholly on complexity theoretic security - so that it can be completely software based, as well as the author lacking any special privilege when the source is released. Computationally security necessitates a certain minimum amount of entropy. For UI reasons, Apple would like to skimp on the required entropy, and thus employs additional non-complexity-based means of security. While this provides security for a casual user against a casual attacker, it unfortunately creates a juicy target for USG to fixate on, as in the current proceedings. It would have been more responsible for Apple to have designed their system so that low entropy passcodes were directly crackable by USG, rather than leaving themselves in a privileged position they can be compelled to use.

mindslight 11y ago

That's orthogonal to what I said. But to address your implicit point about UI - 64 bits of entropy is 6 diceware words, which seems eminently doable for your casual user wanting casual security. Phones are kept in possession more, and thus need a cold-unlock less frequently. And users are still free to compromise their security by using less entropy, just as they are currently regarding Apple (and likely by extension USG, as is currently being worked out). Also tamper-resistant hardware isn't strictly incompatible with Free software. Imagine a security model that allowed loading of whatever software image, but wiped nonvolatile storage before doing so.

superuser2 11y ago
People were annoyed enough by 4 digits that Touch ID was a major selling point. 6 words isn't gonna happen. But you already can use such a password with an iPhone, and if you do, the attack the FBI is attempting won't work. Software freedom doesn't enter into it. What should (and might) happen is Apple's model being amended to also require a code-signing key held by the user, encrypted with the rest of the phone. Apple could do this in its closed-source model, and Free Software wouldn't necessarily do that. Proper security design here really has nothing to do with whether the software is free.
- mindslight 11y ago
  Surprise surprise, pop culture is based on laziness. Free software generally relies wholly on complexity theoretic security - so that it can be completely software based, as well as the author lacking any special privilege when the source is released. Computationally security necessitates a certain minimum amount of entropy. For UI reasons, Apple would like to skimp on the required entropy, and thus employs additional non-complexity-based means of security. While this provides security for a casual user against a casual attacker, it unfortunately creates a juicy target for USG to fixate on, as in the current proceedings. It would have been more responsible for Apple to have designed their system so that low entropy passcodes were directly crackable by USG, rather than leaving themselves in a privileged position they can be compelled to use.