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This doesn't provide additional security. If your bootloader is compromised, it could boot into a compromised kernel (bootkit) that will fake any syscalls that
by cyphar 11y ago
This doesn't provide additional security. If your bootloader is compromised, it could boot into a compromised kernel (bootkit) that will fake any syscalls that attempt to figure out if the system is compromised. No, signatures and hashes won't help (you can just return the old files, or store your changes to the files and return the file contents with your changes reverted).
It's the same problem as UEFI defining that a certain UEFI variable will be set if you booted securely -- but a malicious kernel could just fake that UEFI variable.
Instead, you should have authenticated encryption for both /boot and your root filesystem. GRUB has been able to boot from encrypted partitions for a while, we should push for that to be the default (I'm not sure if it's authenticated encryption though).
- nailer 11y agoGood, I'm not the only one. I was waiting for the readme to mention how they'd solved the chicken / egg problem here: you can't guarantee integrity of boot until you've loaded the OS, and you can't load the OS until you've guaranteed the integrity of boot. I was thinking I'd missed something.