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> The NSA should probably evaluate if the end result of their refusal was more security or less. They could but they'd conclude it was MORE secure. Her leaving
by Someone1234 11y ago
> The NSA should probably evaluate if the end result of their refusal was more security or less.
They could but they'd conclude it was MORE secure. Her leaving the SCIF to use an insecure device is infinitely more secure than allowing insecure devices into the SCIF or giving out highly sensitive devices like candy (in particular as she wanted to use it for non-top secret email).
Cellphones can be attacked and turned into bugs (e.g. baseband hacking). A bug in the SCIF is unacceptable, and having any wireless devices at all makes it much harder to detect bugging from other avenues.
Additionally giving out the president's "Black Phone" to more people makes it easier to attack since they'd have more opportunities and potential mistakes. Plus what if the black phone was compromised? Now you've exposed the SCIF in state.
- krapp 11y agoEvery one of your justifications for denying a secure Blackberry to the Secretary of State work just as well to justify denying one to the President.
- Someone1234 11y agoExcept: > Additionally giving out the president's "Black Phone" to more people makes it easier to attack since they'd have more opportunities and potential mistakes. It is worth knowing that the US President himself has two phones. A black phone and a regular smartphone for everything else.
- krapp 11y agoGiving one to the Secretary of State (which was, at one point, apparently acceptable) isn't really in the same class of risk as giving it to an intern. It's a risk, but why is it no longer an acceptable risk?