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> The FBI has been terrific at reading statutes — including CALEA — in ways that require the rest of us to do headstands to understand what the agency is up to.
by jessriedel 11y ago
> The FBI has been terrific at reading statutes — including CALEA — in ways that require the rest of us to do headstands to understand what the agency is up to. Their claim about CALEA in their latest brief in the Apple case is a shining example of just this kind of breathless, vertiginous, Alice-in-Wonderland assertion: CALEA, they say, limited only law enforcement’s authority to directly require companies to redesign devices and software. But once law enforcement is authorized by a court to do a search — given a search warrant, in other words — then (under the AWA) an FBI official can ask the court to do what law enforcement is prohibited from doing directly under section 1002 of CALEA.
I don't get it. Law enforcement is explicitly prohibited from doing all sorts of things without a warrant that can then later be compelled by a court order. If the police don't have a warrant, they can't search your house. But if they do, they can, and if you have a locked safe, they can get a court order that compels you to open it.
I think what the FBI is asking for here from Apple is almost certainly a bad thing, but the above argument doesn't go through.
> Got it? Right, I don’t either. As the well-respected lawyer Albert Gidari carefully explains in a recent blog post, this is a weirdly circular argument that ignores the specific limitation Congress enacted to remove the government from the business of dictating the design of phones or software. No gaps; no interpretive sunlight: CALEA stops the government from doing what it wants to do to Apple.
Look, I think it's useful to discuss the overall impact of "the government" or "the state" as much as the next pseudo-libertarian. But here I think the author is trying to interpret a restriction on law enforcement as obviously intended to restrict the government as a whole, but that's not obvious at all. Distinguishing between law enforcement and the government as a whole isn't complicated, headstand-inducing legal gymnastics, it's well-established legal reasoning.
- oldmanjay 11y agoAre you interpreting the statute via the author's explanation in order to shoot down the explanation, or are you interpreting the statute differently than the author and disagreeing?
- studentrob 11y agoHer argument made sense to me. Further, I'd point out the author studied law and has a JD from Yale. And she was Obama's tech advisor. And she was/is an internet activist. She knows what she's talking about. She is probably among those who understand this case the best.
- andreyf 11y agoShe understand the law and she's taken a strong stance on the legal case. I'm sure the DoJ understands the law, as well, and it were actually obvious and clear, the DoJ would have advised the FBI that they don't have a case. From the policy perspective, I think it's important to think about single user disk encryption in the context of its sibling question: end-to-end encryption (e2ee). They are separate legal questions, of course, but not wholly unrelated in terms of the bigger picture.
- studentrob 11y agoThere's another possibility, which is that the Attorney General didn't think through the case, or didn't examine CALEA closely enough before deciding to go the All Writs Act route. From a policy perspective, we don't want the government mandating that a business use any particular form of security in its devices. We want industry to compete on those systems and let the customer choose what security mechanism they prefer. Right?
- andreyf 11y ago> the Attorney General didn't think through the case, or didn't examine CALEA closely enough With a case of this magnitude? That seems to me unlikely to the point of impossibility. That's one side of the argument. The other argument, as I understand it, is that this is a step to a future akin to a Neal Stephenson novel, one we do not want to live in. The most persuasive counter-argument I see is that this future is inevitable. The most persuasive counter-counter argument is that while moving towards a future where people have access to un-subpoenable smart phones and communication mechanisms which guarantee absolute privacy [1] may be the "current of technology", how quickly we get there and the direction from which we approach it is of the outmost importance, and "in the near future and for people who can afford smart phones" is not the right timing nor direction. 1. "Absolute privacy" defined as secrecy of content and meta-data, from everyone and forever.
- pdonis 11y ago> if you have a locked safe, they can get a court order that compels you to open it. But in this case, the FBI wants the safe manufacturer--not the owner of the safe, who is the one who could be compelled to open it by court order--to redesign the lock on the safe so that the FBI can keep trying combinations indefinitely until it opens. That's not the same thing.
- jessriedel 11y agoThis isn't the point I'm addressing.
- pdonis 11y agoThen I don't understand your position. Just because a court order can compel some things that law enforcement can't compel in its absence, it does not follow that a court order can compel anything that law enforcement can't compel in its absence. But that seems to be what you're claiming--or at least it seems to be the grounds on which you're rejecting the argument you were responding to. My point is that even if a court order can compel the owner of a secret to either divulge it to law enforcement or face consequences, that doesn't mean it can compel a third party to help law enforcement pry loose the secret in the owner's absence. That seems to be precisely the distinction the article is making.
- AnthonyMouse 11y ago> Law enforcement is explicitly prohibited from doing all sorts of things without a warrant that can then later be compelled by a court order. It doesn't say they can't do it without a warrant. It says they unconditionally can't do it. > Distinguishing between law enforcement and the government as a whole isn't complicated, headstand-inducing legal gymnastics, it's well-established legal reasoning. The problem with trying to draw that distinction is that having the court order you to do it is how it always works. If CALEA said the FBI could order Apple to build the back door, the FBI still couldn't just throw Tim Cook in prison without trial if he refuses. They would still have to go to the court. So what the law is really saying is that law enforcement can't ask the court to order that -- but here they are asking anyway.
- jessriedel 11y ago> It says they unconditionally can't do it. This isn't correct. More precisely, it does not address obtaining court orders. > If CALEA said the FBI could order Apple to build the back door, the FBI still couldn't just throw Tim Cook in prison without trial if he refuses. They would still have to go to the court. If the EPA tells you that you can't dump in the river, and you dump in a river, then they can prosecute you and send you to jail. But this is very different then getting a court order to do something as part of an investigation.
- AnthonyMouse 11y ago> This isn't correct. More precisely, it does not address obtaining court orders. Please explain how the FBI could legally compel Apple to do something without a court order. If it's the only way it can happen then it's kind of implied. > If the EPA tells you that you can't dump in the river, and you dump in a river, then they can prosecute you and send you to jail. But this is very different then getting a court order to do something as part of an investigation. The primary difference apparently being that in that case there is something the law says you can't do, whereas in this case there is something the law says the government can't do.