5 ms·
I feel like there's good theoretical comp sci work to be done here to show that this system won't work. I've outlined two open problems below: APPROACH 1: Su
by kristopolous 11y ago
I feel like there's good theoretical comp sci work to be done here to show that this system won't work. I've outlined two open problems below:
APPROACH 1:
Suppose we have a state issued crypto-system F0(Tc) -> Tp.
Alice decides to place another crypto-system F1 on top of that which the state doesn't know about.
Alice unlocks her phone which runs the state's system F0(Tp) -> T1. However, T1 is still encrypted by the unauthorized second-tier crypto-system, F1. This middleware piece of software then runs F1(T1) -> Tp and we have our plaintext. The state, of course, doesn't have the backdoor keys to F1.
The question is how can one prevent this secondary crypto-system from existing? And if one can't, doesn't it make F0 merely a useless ornament that unwraps one cyphertext matryoshka only to reveal another?
APPROACH 2:
idea: any system with a built in guarantee of access by a delegated third party is in contradiction with some theoretical constraints of a generalized security system and puts the whole construction in a lowered security 'level' which had a smaller set of assurances.
Given a user generated token Ku, ciphered text Tc, and plaintext Tp, you have decryption as a function:
F0(Tc, Kc) -> Tp
This requirement is for another key to exist for the State, Ka such that a decryption function F1 (which may or may not be the same as F0) yields:
F1(Tc, Ka) -> Tp
Ka is allowed to be a "salted" key on a per device basis so it can vary across devices as an input to F1.
It does this through another secret function, F2 whose input will be the per-device salt Ds, and a super-global law enforcement key Kl - our secretly held master key.
Law enforcement applies the secret key Kl on the Device and generates the device's master key, Ka by using the Device's Salt:
F2(Ds, Kl) -> Ka
This means that for the law enforcement it's
F1(Tc, F2(Ds, Kl)) -> Tp
Where F1, F2, and Kl are secrets. Tp, Tc, and Ds is known by us and we are free to change.
Here's the issues:
Kl is global across all devices.
F1() must always work regardless of user generated Ku although Ds is allowed to change as a function of Ku.
If I can generate as many Tc and Ds as I can, can we show that given a known F0, F1 and F2 can only be constructed from a exhaustibly reasonable finite set.
How about the idea that the cost of brute-forcing Kl, the master law enforcement key, continually decreases as the number of devices that Kl can open, thus the value of Kl, continually increases? What do the range of those slopes look like?
- rcthompson 11y agoAny otherwise well-designed system with a built in guarantee of access by a third party is only secure if you can trust that third party. You don't need to prove any theorems to know that. I don't think anyone is arguing that such a system is impossible to build, they're arguing that no such trusted third party exists, and no one who actually cares about keeping a secret would ever willingly use such a system when alternatives exist.
- kristopolous 11y agoI'm interested in the argument line that would be "Ok, let's assume you are impeccably honest, infallible, and have unwavering integrity and unstealable secrets ... even under those laughable, impossible conditions, it's still a terrible idea because of the following..." and go from there.
- quadlock 11y agoThe perfect recipient would still have to be sent backdoors from many creators. Many more people would be handling the secret, each one a target to be social engineered into handing it over. I imagine when a more typical backdoor is made, very few people even know it exists let alone know the key to open it. Mandate backdoors and everyone knows they exist so more people will work to find and crack them. They would be very high value targets. Once opened, a backdoor would take a lot of work and expense to be closed, if you even know it had been opened.
- kristopolous 11y agoYes, the whole idea is about as plausible as this april fools joke: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_bit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_bit ... but it's been put forth and implemented too many times for comfort. Each time these silly systems like DVD-CSS broke down and became worthless or like DIVX, were widely panned and rejected by the consumer.* Showing how this will always and forever be the case at a more fundamental level to stop trying this deadbeat idea with different gift-wrapping would be great. * Even in MP3, you have bits 29 and 30 which are for copyright. What were they thinking? people would re-implement /bin/cp to look for that and fail if the bit is set? Really? AAC has something similar. silly.