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My intuitions are generally with you, but Tor developers have claimed that low-latency anonymity against a pervasive network adversary may be impossible, and fo
by schoen 11y ago
My intuitions are generally with you, but Tor developers have claimed that low-latency anonymity against a pervasive network adversary may be impossible, and formally excluded it from their threat model back in 2004. In that case, the best that can be done may be to defend successfully against some weaker adversaries (although a better move in many ways is to switch to high-latency anonymity).
Maybe successfully defending against the weaker adversaries is useful to many people, although it raises a serious challenge of how to clearly disclose the risks and limitations, which I see as a very important challenge for Tor on both the browser and hidden service sides.
(Hidden services might have categorically worse problems so that there's almost no realistic threat model in which their current design is safe; maybe that's what you're getting at?)
- tptacek 11y agoYes. I share Dan Guido's take on Tor. It's an interesting and important research project that is in no way appropriate for the problems to which most of its users apply it. Like everything else in cryptography, users don't care if things are insecure: things must be secure, because users want them to be! Ignore the Tor users getting zorched by governments; they're all outliers!
- dguido 11y ago> My intuitions are generally with you, but Tor developers have claimed that low-latency anonymity against a pervasive network adversary may be impossible, and formally excluded it from their threat model back in 2004. This is a point that I wish more people were familiar with. Tor has been oversold as the privacy project to protect from everything. The Snowden docs leaked out and privacy activists ruffled around their pockets asking, "what do we have to rally behind?" They found Tor and stuck with it, despite it certainly not being built for that task.