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I see this objection raised so frequently, and I feel it really misses the point badly. The tech community tells itself that it won the first "crypto wars". Yo
by mike_hearn 11y ago
I see this objection raised so frequently, and I feel it really misses the point badly.
The tech community tells itself that it won the first "crypto wars". You cannot win "wars" against governments in that sort of sense and the first crypto war was never actually won at all. I think in light of events in recent years we need to reinterpret the events of the 90's in a new light - the tech industry didn't win, rather, after realising how awful and worthless the software the cypherpunks produced really was, the government simply got bored of playing.
Nobody, and I mean nobody, gives one tiny shit about GPG. GPG is so bad, such truly unusable software, that terrorists would literally rather die or risk lifetime imprisonment than use it:
http://privacy-pc.com/articles/how-terrorists-encrypt-threatscape-overview.html
Governments don't care about GPG now, they don't care about some theoretical open source program that you could install from abroad, they only care about the encryption their adversaries actually use which - given that 99.9% of the FBI's adversaries are not crypto experts - turns out to be whatever ordinary people are using automatically thanks to tech companies switching it on.
This is especially true because often people don't meticulously plan crimes out ahead of time: they either commit crimes of passion, or they make basic mistakes. So if you have to plan ahead and convince not only yourself, but all your accomplices, all to install some exotic and awkward to use piece of technology ... well, a lot of bad guys won't do it.
So. If the FBI succeeds in breaking the encryption used by Apple, Google, Microsoft, Twitter, Facebook and a few other big names, then they've got 99% of the guys they want.
- kbart 11y agoIf the worst case scenario fulfill and people will get jailed for petty crimes based on evidence snooped from their personal electronic devices and social media accounts, they will realize that they actually have something to hide and will look for alternatives to puppet companies. That's where open source and/or non-USA&Co originated software comes to play. See Twitter and Whatsapp role in recent mass protests.
- TillE 11y agoUsage patterns can easily change for a variety of reasons. WhatsApp is hugely popular now, but tomorrow it might be something else not based in the US. If they manage to write a law such that it bans strong encryption from the App Store, that will achieve their goal. But any other scenario is at best a temporary gain.
- jpgvm 11y agoGPG was just an example. Other end-to-end open-source systems are more widely used like Signal are the same, not exactly easy to insert a backdoor into a system that is a) open and b) completely distributed with no central key authority. Maybe it still misses the point because the FBI doesn't actually care about hitting hard targets. If that is the case that is pretty sad. Average crimes can be solved with average tools, we shouldn't be authorising access to phones and other electronic intercepts or access without crimes that go beyond average. You could argue the San Bernadino case was beyond average, and you would probably be right. But the perps knew that too, that is why they destroyed the phones after they were done, chances are they took other measures too but no one will know as they destroyed the devices. What is clear is not that these laws wouldn't make their jobs easier - they almost certainly would. But they aren't needed and that implementing them would have 0 effect on the actually hard targets that they in theory would be useful for neutralising.
- JoshTriplett 11y ago> Other end-to-end open-source systems are more widely used like Signal are the same, not exactly easy to insert a backdoor into a system that is a) open and b) completely distributed with no central key authority. If Signal weren't available from any of the major app stores, such that it didn't work on iOS at all and didn't work on Android devices without turning on the intimidating option to allow non-Play-Store apps, how much usage do you think it would get compared to today? Making real security hard to get would cause far fewer people to actually use it.
- graycat 11y agoYup. By analogy the lawyers can outlaw six egg omelets with butter and orange flavor. So, then McDonald's won't be able to sell them, but I can still make them in my own kitchen. The lawyers can outlaw strong encryption on products from Apple, Google, Microsoft, etc. and, then, crooks who use those products can more easily be caught, and that will amount to nearly all the common crooks. But I can still get some simple, open source C code for some simple command line RSA or PGP de/encryption and use it for secure communications with others who do the same. And serious people will, and likely do. I.e., just get the open source code for RSA from Schneier's book or look at the open source code in Zimmerman's PGP. Or just read Schneier's book and write your own code and make it open source for yourself and all people you want to communicate with. So, to send an encrypted message in a file, from a smartphone, tablet, laptop, desktop, etc., copy the file to an old computer, if only via diskette, running PC/DOS and never connected to the Internet. Run the command line C program for encryption. Get the output file, in just simple base 64. Then copy that file to the smartphone or whatever and send it, with no attempt at security. Done. This way, it doesn't matter what Apple, Google, Microsoft, do/don't do since they are just moving base 64 gibberish that is perfectly safe even if printed in the NYT. The command line programs? Easy enough for middle school children to use. Simple. Math 1. Lawyers 0. Now what is there to argue about? So, all this stuff about the FBI is just the village idiot playing public pocket pool, right?
- visarga 11y ago> Then copy that file to the smartphone or whatever and send it, with no attempt at security. Done. They still know who you are communicating with. There are ways to communicate without disclosing with who you are communicating.
- snowwrestler 11y ago> they only care about the encryption their adversaries actually use which - given that 99.9% of the FBI's adversaries are not crypto experts - turns out to be whatever ordinary people are using automatically thanks to tech companies switching it on. Of course, this is also the technology that 99.9% of U.S. federal staff use too. Probably more like 100% counting personal use of technology. Across the board, enterprise security today is dependent on the security of consumer technology. Unfortunately, a lot of people in the federal government don't get this; they still think there is a difference between "secure federal technology," and what every else uses. There's not even a Cabinet official charged with enterprise security for the federal government, so there is no one to even speak up. The FBI and intelligence chiefs are all very high-profile, and they are primarily concerned with access, so the federal conversation seems skewed. Which it is--it matches the skew of the federal mindset in general. The best technologists go to the breaking and entering teams. Meanwhile OPM loses 22 million accounts.