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No, I'm not a lawyer, and I'm deliberately simplifying my example to make an argument. However, I have looked into 5a jurisprudence, and fully agree that there
by ohazi 11y ago
No, I'm not a lawyer, and I'm deliberately simplifying my example to make an argument.
However, I have looked into 5a jurisprudence, and fully agree that there are some scenarios that are not so simple, e.g. if they really did have certain other evidence against you that specifically suggests what is in the cryptogram, and/or that it is pertinent, then you could very well end up in jail indefinitely for contempt of court.
In this instance, I strongly suspect that my simplification is justified because in the San Bernardino case and the myriad others that are on the FBI's short list, they are fishing in order to gain a general precedent that they do not currently have. They want to be able to compel you to release a password even when they don't have any evidence suggesting what is in the cryptogram, arguments for why it is pertinent, etc.
- tptacek 11y agoI personally think people should prepare themselves for a future in which compelled production of passwords (or, at least, compelled unlocking of devices and documents) is the norm. The 5A argument about crypto seems really flimsy, and allowing compelled unlocking seems constitutionally more straightforward than a ban on strong cryptography.
- hamburglar 11y agoDoesn't this simply lead to the development of better deniable encryption products?
- tptacek 11y agoThere is less organic pressure for deniable encryption than there is for end-to-end encryption, because the latter is helpful for general-purpose security, and the former is not.
- hamburglar 11y agoI dunno, it's a weak argument, but bad guys can't put effort into attacking that which they don't know exists either.