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The Neuroscientist Who Lost Her Mind
- FreedomToCreate 11y agoThis is the thing that mystifies me the most about the ideas of consciousness and the soul. If we are more than our mind, then how do we explain how changes to our brain, artificial or natural, can drastically change who we are. What does that mean for an afterlife, if we can't even really say who we are in this life.
- monomyth 11y agoIf you break your leg, you will change the way your walk, but not the brain (of course it will change adapting to what has happened, but that's not he point here). Going up a level: if you change your brain you will change the way you think, but not the fact you can think. Going up another level: by changing your mind, you might not change your consciousness.
- paol 11y agoWell, that's why the null hypothesis is that there is no metaphysical soul.
- rcthompson 11y agoI'm pretty sure that the majority of people on the planet do not consider this their null hypothesis.
- labster 11y agoThe majority of people on the planet do not know what a null hypothesis is.
- lliamander 11y agoThe null hypothesis is this: "There is a 'self' which persists through time and is the locus of one's identity." It is this 'self' that people generally mean when they talk about the soul. We have a hard time giving a metaphysical analysis of what this soul is, but that does not mean it does not exist. As it is, the soul (in this functional sense) provides an explanation for too many things that would otherwise be inexplicable.
- akavi 11y agoThat's definitely not what most people mean when they refer to the "soul". And using "soul" to mean that is both confusing and unhelpful.
- lliamander 11y agoIt is certainly included in most people's definition of the soul, and it is difficult to satisfy the definition I provided above and still be a material reductivist.
- chrischen 11y agoYour afterlife starts when your physical brain is revived in the distant future, or when you deviate from the branch of the universe in which you die. In this case some people see you die but you continue living in a different universe. Crossing universes doesn't just happen when you die, it is happening every instant. Obviously when you die your consciousness won't cross into the next instantaneous universe in which you are dead (by definition your consciousness does not exist there anymore so it's not a possible reality to cross into). See https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortality https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortal... for more details. We aren't more than our physical brains, at least not when you include the encoded set of experiences in your brain.
- bendbro 11y agoI think most tech savvy millennials already subscribe to determinism in some form.
- chrischen 11y agoQuantum physicists do not. Determinism has been experimentally disproven.
- balfirevic 11y agoParent commenter might have meant materialism instead of determinism.
- GolDDranks 11y agoThat's not right. The combination of 1) local 2) realist 3) determinism has been disproven by Bell's theorem. But I it's still a "pick two" kind of choice. I, personally think that by Occam's razor, the Everett interpretation ("Many Worlds") makes the most sense, because it's simplest. And actually it retains all of the above three, but it introduces "self-locating uncertainty" (http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7907 http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7907), which effectively has the same kind of effect from our perspective.
- chrischen 11y agoIf you subscribe to many-worlds, then you subscribe to quantum theory, which means you subscribe to quantum indeterminacy. Non-determinism is literally the name of the principle.
- bendbro 11y agoIs quantum indeterminacy related to the Uncertainty Principle? Also, isn't it assumed that quantum effects don't bubble up to the classical level?
- zardo 11y agoBut the only thing that's undetermined is which universe you will find yourself in. In many worlds the multiverse is determined. It's a space-time graph (tree?) with a root at the start of time and leaves at infinity.
- gerbilly 11y agoA monk asked a Zen master: “What happens when you die?” The Zen master replied: "I don’t know.” The monk said: “What do you mean. Aren’t you a Zen master?” And the Zen Master replied: “Yes, but I’m not a dead one.”
- melvinmt 11y ago"After some years we will die. If we just think that it is the end of our life, this will be the wrong understanding. But, on the other hand, if we think that we do not die, this is also wrong. We die, and we do not die. This is the right understanding. Some people may say that our mind or soul exists forever, and it is only our physical body which dies. But this is not exactly right, because both mind and body have their end. But at the same time it is also true that they exist eternally. And even though we say mind and body, they are actually two sides of one coin. This is the right understanding." - Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind
- jrapdx3 11y agoWonderful quote, great wisdom. Interestingly, the passage speaks to ideas that exist across cultures, and throughout the centuries. It's remarkably similar to the philosophy of Spinoza, particularly embodied in his seminal work, the Ethics published in 1677. For example, in the Ethics Spinoza wrote (roughly translated) "eternity cannot be defined in terms of time, or have any relation to time". I puzzled over this idea for many years, extending to decades. More recently I've thought it prescient, in a way anticipating the concept of "space-time". Indeed that may not be coincidental given Einstein's statement that he was strongly influenced by Spinoza. So it's not a surprise, in fact even reassuring that such insights permeate human thought, as the Zen Mind nicely demonstrates. Edit: grammar
- gerbilly 11y agoThese questions are among the questions that the Buddha refused to answer one way or the other because he considered them distractions from the meditative life.[i] The real goal of Buddhism is the elimination of suffering in oneself and others and is purposefully silent on the 'big questions.' [i] http://www.faculty.umb.edu/michael_lafargue/104/204/budd/rdngs/btxt1.htm http://www.faculty.umb.edu/michael_lafargue/104/204/budd/rdn...
- gulpahum 11y agoStephen Hawking has concluded in his book "The Grand Design": "So it seems that we are no more than biological machines and that free will is just an illusion." [1] Machines don't have afterlife. So, enjoy every moment you live right now! :) [1] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deepak-chopra/stephen-hawkings-grand-bo_b_708958.html http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deepak-chopra/stephen-hawkings...
- 0xdeadbeefbabe 11y agoI don't buy the we're smarter than we've ever been argument. It sounds very much like the religious people who feel certain of witnessing the end of the world. > Einstein had a strong feeling for the presence of awe and wonder at the far horizon of the cosmos and saw evidence for the existence of a unifying, rational presence in the mathematical order of the cosmos. But since then the universe of theoretical physics has become random, complex, paradoxical, and barren of divine presence. At least the atheist brigade remains constant. That's a comfort.
- SpaceCadetJones 11y agohttps://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flynn_effect https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flynn_effect
- cgio 11y agoHawking makes a careful statement and employs the word "seems" not as a padding but intentionally. I take his statement at face value and still don't get to the confident deductions you make. For one "seems" is allowing room to account for something currently or forever invisible. And then how can you assert that machines don't have an afterlife?
- jsprogrammer 11y agoWhat do you mean, "who we are", in your second sentence?
- FreedomToCreate 11y agoI mean i relation to our mind. If I took a hammer to your skull, I could fundamentally alter your personality. So the person you are right now is variable, depending on the state of your brain. So with that has a fundamental fact, who are you really but the state of your brain at the moment?
- jsprogrammer 11y agoHow do you measure a personality? What are its constraints? It appears to me that I am more than my brain. I have a body that I think I can control. If you define "you" as a sequence of states of matter, then the rest of your body should count too. >So the person you are right now is variable, depending on the state of your brain. So with that has a fundamental fact, who are you really but the state of your brain at the moment? This feels a bit circular to me.
- lliamander 11y agoA: "it seems the evidence of the prosecution overwhelmingly identifies you as the robber of the convenience store. What evidence do you provide in your defense?" B: " 'I' am nothing other than my present brain state. Since the entity that robbed the convenience store possessed a different brain state, we cannot be the same person." Not sure how that would fly. Maybe there is a meaningful concept of personhood that transcends specific brain states?
- ux-app 11y ago>Not sure how that would fly I think it's generally accepted that, barring mental illness, we're accountable for our previous brain states.
- jsprogrammer 11y ago
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- xg15 11y agoI wouldn't say it is proven yet, but I think the possibility that our whole consciousness might be a based on biology is loaded with a lot more fear that is justified. For the sake of the argument, let's assume it is true - there is no metaphysical soul, and all aspects of the self we asdociate with it - memories, character, consciousness, etc... - are the product of electrochemical reactions inside the body. In other words, we are "deterministic" and whatever we do could be perfectly predicted by following the laws of physics. I think this wouldn't actually devalue the consciousness very much. "Cogito ergo sum" still applies. There still exists a phenomenon called "consciousness" and there still exist entities who can choose an action, given their memories and the impressions of the world they experience. Technically, yes, humans would be reduced to "mere machines", however machines which are incredibly more complex and nuanced than everything we are capable to build or understand as of now. Also machines who are thinking about themself and have performed all the accomplishments of human history. And I don't think any of this would be going. The need to consider subjective experiences and well-being wouldn't go either, btw. The need to have a solid ethical foundation and sound morals would be as strong as ever. If anything it could become broader and give more justification for e.g. animal rights. But I can't see anything bad with that.
- adrusi 11y agoYes. The claim that explaining consciousness as purely a result of biology (physicalism) devalues consciousness is the same as the claim that explaining the color red as result of photons released when electrons settle into lower energy states devalues redness.
- kotach 11y agoStudies on twins, especially those that observe separated ones, pretty much show how much bodies behave in a deterministic way, from diseases, to relationships, names, jobs, wishes.
- mjklin 11y agoIt may be the case that a healthy brain is necessary for a healthy personality. It is not clear, however what follows from this. If a person's brain stops functioning normally, does he become less human? If a dolphin or monkey can demonstrate more intelligent actions than the brain-damaged person, does this make them more human than they are? More worthy of life? These are the kind of questions they ask in your local philosophy department.
- Jimmy 11y agoAlmost no philosophers today (who specialize in the philosophy of mind) believe in an immaterial soul. They believe that there is nothing beyond the physical when it comes to consciousness.
- mjklin 11y agoHow about Roger Scruton? http://www.spectator.co.uk/2012/03/brain-drain/ http://www.spectator.co.uk/2012/03/brain-drain/
- unclebucknasty 11y agoPerhaps, like the rest of the body, the brain is more an interface between the physical world and the "true self" (call it "soul" if you prefer). That includes relationships with others' interfaces. In this view, changing the brain merely changes how we perceive the world, our behavior in it and, thus, how we are perceived by and relate to others. Interestingly, it can also change our sense of our own self in relation to the world. When you consider disorders like depersonalization and derealization, they seem to be exactly a defect in this sensory system. The nature of who you are hasn't changed, but your sense of who you are has.
- Houshalter 11y agoThere's zero evidence of an afterlife or souls of any kind. And overwhelming evidence that your behavior is controlled entirely by your brain. You are your brain. Nothing more. This life is the only one you will get!
- Alex3917 11y agoMeh. I always hate these articles about neuroscientists having non-ordinary experiences. Either heterophenomenology is valid or it isn't, whether or not you're a neuroscientist should be largely irrelevant. If her training as a neuroscientist was providing some sort of special insight into her subjective experiences then that would be one thing, but that's never actually the case with these articles, other than intermittently having some basic awareness of what might be going on. By privileging the experiences of people whose backgrounds don't have any real epistemological relevancy, I feel like these articles epitomize the hegemonic aspects of science, which is troubling on multiple levels.
- emodendroket 11y ago...Huh?
- vixen99 11y agoThanks! In future I'm sure we'll all be extra careful to run checks ensuring folks' backgrounds have real epistemological relevancy before privileging their experiences in publication.
- lliamander 11y agoAgreed. I find her experiences interesting, but there really isn't anything in her description that is novel when compared to a "lay" person's description. Metaphors are always a bit tricky, but you might say it's like someone asking a computer hardware engineer how to use software on their computer[1]. Perhaps this experience did give her some new insight, but if so it was more contextual and related specifically to her work, rather than a general insight into human nature. Of course, it is good for people to share these kinds of experiences, but we should ask ourselves why it matters to us that it was a scientist who experienced them. The special status of science comes directly from the fact that it relies on objective observation and experimentation rather than subjective experience, consensus, or authority. Emphasizing any of the latter three simply because they come from scientists, suggests that we are trying to treat science as a priesthood, rather than addressing it on its own terms. It also means we've given "science", as a social institution, more power than it merits. [1]http://xkcd.com/1588/ http://xkcd.com/1588/
- anon79 11y agoInterestingly, I could accurately describe my experience of mania due to bipolar disorder using the exact same words / description as the author. The similarity of the subjective symptoms is overwhelming. And yet, the pathology seems very different.
- kittiepryde 11y agoI kept thinking in that last paragraph, where she describes everything as going good again, what if its still a delusion like before?
- drdeca 11y agoSuppose you created a machine which, in the style of Solomonoff induction (sorta), was designed to find as short or as "elegant" (in whatever sense of that word) of a (computation based) description of the world (so, it makes a model of the inputs it receives, and it receives many inputs, including from the internet, etc.) Further, pretend that it has arbitrarily large computational resources. Even if it could completely predict the inputs it receives (modulo quantum mechanics based randomness), would you expect that it's internal model of the world includes some description of consciousness, of an internal experience? I do not mean, would it have some sort of a model of agents, entities that act in a way that tends to optimize some things or other, Rather, I specifically mean the internal experience of things, not just being able to predict that people would say that they experience. I do not think that it would come up with a model of internal experience, And yet, I experience, and so do you. So, I think an understanding of reality based only on computation about physical objects, is incomplete.
- Houshalter 11y agoYes. If you ran Solomonoff induction on the world, it would generate (countably infinite!) many simulations of people in the world, each of which would act exactly as they do in the world. They would experience the same things, say the same things, behave exactly the same way in every respect. Including having the same thoughts and feelings you are right now, and typing the exact same comment.
- drdeca 11y agoTwo things: 1) I didn't necessarily mean exactly Solomonoff induction, as what I was describing would be for finding a single good description, rather than making good predictions using a weighted combinations of many descriptions. 2)Well, whether they would have experiences is a topic which is of some debate I think. They would behave as if they did, but, would they? If the simulation is run twice concurrently, are the experiences had twice as much? There are all sorts of potential complications with things like computation with secret sharing schemes, and so I don't think the question is really settled. ____ My point was that even if something describes what occurs, what particles end up in what configurations, that doesn't seem to be a description of what is experienced, even if it predicts how people will self report their experiences, and give causal explanations for their self reporting of their internal experience.