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That's not quite true you can validate the scripts the server is sending you, various hashing algorithms are sufficient and although not prevalent today you can
by dogma1138 11y ago
That's not quite true you can validate the scripts the server is sending you, various hashing algorithms are sufficient and although not prevalent today you can always use the "archive" attribute[0] in your script tags to provide an archive with digital signatures (this was a feature in Netscape and even early IE) it was used in the mid to late 90's when SSL wasn't that prevalent.
But this isn't that relevant today mainly because of SSL, and while it's true that the server can serve you a modified script even over SSL but it can only do that in such cases when the server has been compromised (excluding any attacks that break/MITM SSL) in which case if you can't trust the content that is served by the server you can't trust the content stored on it either.
But lets say that it's still not enough then well a client side encryption in the browser either natively or via an addon can provide the required functionality to make web apps work properly even without providing all the functionality over the wire.
There are quite a few hybrid webapps for Chrome that do not work without an addon or those for which the addon adds allot of functionality that could not be efficiently offered by current web only standards.
[0]https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms970704.aspx https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms970704.aspx
- Freak_NL 11y agoThe problem here is that there is no way for the average user to tell if the server itself is serving you client-side code that will actually encrypt your data before sending it to the server. The browser security model explicitly depends on trusting the remote server (whose identity you verified using TLS, and with whom you can communicate securily) with whatever data you enter client-side. With end-to-end encryption of e-mail, the server is not part of the immediate trust model; it is to act only as a transfer agent. This is why end-to-end e-mail encryption is easy with a dedicated mail user agent (MUA) such as Thunderbird with Enigmail, but awkward with webmail, where you need a third party browser plugin (such as Mailvelope) to provide the encryption step.
- vbezhenar 11y agoI'll give you an example. There's a software that was audited: Truecrypt. I know hash of the executable that was audited, so I can download that executable, verify it's hash signature and use it for my purposes. But if I use crypto in browser, it's like I'm downloading Truecrypt every time from the website. And there's no easy way to determine that I downloaded exactly that binary that was audited and used by everyone else. So if FBI (or narco cartel) reached authors of that software and they want to attack me, they have a perfect attack vector: identify me and serve me a modified code. There could be an addon providing that functionality, but I'm not aware of any. And installing additional addon isn't much easier than just installing a separate software. Web apps are only good because they are easy to launch.
- dogma1138 11y agoWhen you use crypto in the browser it will be either natively provided by the browser or via javascript. In both cases you can always ensure the integrity of the crypto if you trust the initial integrity check. You can verify the hash for every javascript you download it's even integrally supported by the browser (but not used as SSL solves this issue more easily). The only thing you need to so is to have a hash of the javascript code that you know has been audited which you considered to be trusted beyond that if you download it once or a million times it doesn't matter. To make it a bit more cleared the TrueCrypts bootloader is not encrypted and there is little to no integrity checks as it doesn't support TPM or CPU specific security features in this case you have no ability to validate that the TC instance that you boot is the actual instance that you have installed and that it wasn't compromised.