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The fundamental issue is that any back door accessible to "the good guys" will also be accessible to sufficiently-technically-advanced "bad guys". And from the

The fundamental issue is that any back door accessible to "the good guys" will also be accessible to sufficiently-technically-advanced "bad guys". And from the perspective of securing the United States' defense infrastructure, major corporations, etc., there are multiple sufficiently-technically-advanced "bad guys" in the world already (i.e., certain major foreign governments and their intelligence/defense complexes). So if you're doing US national security, you cannot accept the Obama position; any technology to which our "good guy" law enforcement could get access is guaranteed to also be a technology to which a "bad guy" foreign enemy combatant could similarly gain access. If you're a major US corporation, you cannot accept the Obama position; any technology to which our "good guy" law enforcement could get access is guaranteed to also be a technology to which a "bad guy" foreign intelligence/espionage agent could similarly gain access. So as far as that is concerned, it is binary. You can either be secure against foreign threats, in which case you are also as a side effect impenetrable to the local "good guys". Or you can be penetrable by the local "good guys" and also as a side effect penetrable by the foreign "bad guys". The argument advanced against Obama's position is that A) it fundamentally fails to acknowledge this reality, and B) seems to argue for deliberately compromising national security in order to... preserve national security? In other words, it is not only unrealistic, it is in fact nonsensical and self-contradictory.

andrewfromx 11y ago
wow, that's the best writing on this whole thing I've read. well done. I tweeted it https://twitter.com/andrewarrow/status/709158302127509504 https://twitter.com/andrewarrow/status/709158302127509504
- jonathanmh 11y ago
  Thank you! I really should have put a lot more into this, because I have a ton of examples. Really need to do a follow up
harryh 11y ago
We're talking about iPhones here. Not the nuclear launch codes. Maybe you have information on your phone that KGB is interested in, but most people don't. Again, security & encryption aren't binary. It isn't on or off. Different levels of protection are appropriate for different levels of threats. The lock on my mom's suburban house is a lot weaker than the lock on the vault holding the gold at Fort Knox. Similarly the kind of security appropriate for consumer grade cell phones might be different than the kind appropriate for guarding US national security secrets.
- sk5t 11y ago
  And you presume that compromising the iPhones belonging to the men and women who do control the nuclear launch codes wouldn't serve to compromise everything they control, by extension? Either by using the data as a lever against the people, or directly snooping, this would be a very powerful opening, and your position seems to defy all common sense.
  - harryh 11y ago
    Obama used the word "fetishizing" for a reason. It's a pretty unusual word to use don't you think? It was carefully chosen though I'm sure. Comments like this are exactly why he used it.
    - mhurron 11y ago
      Yes he did use it for a reason. He used it to make it seem perverse that you would want your information on your phone to be secure. Hes is trying, once again, to put forth the governments position that if you're not trying to hide something, you have nothing to fear. And quite frankly, yes, I do hold the security and privacy of data as more important than the terrorism song and dance the government is playing. And I do hold that view absolutely.
- ubernostrum 11y ago
  Maybe you have information on your phone that KGB is interested in, but most people don't. You have a very narrow view of what information is sensitive. Do you know how many Americans work either directly in, or in industries associated with, defense? How many of them use Apple products as part of their work? Or let's take a more down-to-earth example: I work for a company in the health-care space. We have health records on thousands of people, and as we expand we'll have more health records on more people. With your approach, where should we draw the line? Would it be OK to use security bad enough that, say, an Eastern European organized-crime ring could break in? Or do we need to defend against them and not against the KGB? How do we figure out what level of tools to use to do that? How do we figure out whether what we have now will still be mafia-proof in five years? Oh, and keep in mind that legally we have to protect that data, and improper access to it can not just shut down the company but send me and my co-workers to jail. How much would you be willing to compromise with that on the line? If the potential consequences to you were jail time, how much on the side of Obama and the FBI would you be? How much risk of that would you take on in order to make law enforcement's life a little bit easier? And in case you think this is a red herring, remember the San Bernardino shooter... worked for a public-health department.

andrewfromx 11y ago

wow, that's the best writing on this whole thing I've read. well done. I tweeted it https://twitter.com/andrewarrow/status/709158302127509504 https://twitter.com/andrewarrow/status/709158302127509504

jonathanmh 11y ago
Thank you! I really should have put a lot more into this, because I have a ton of examples. Really need to do a follow up

harryh 11y ago

We're talking about iPhones here. Not the nuclear launch codes. Maybe you have information on your phone that KGB is interested in, but most people don't. Again, security & encryption aren't binary. It isn't on or off. Different levels of protection are appropriate for different levels of threats. The lock on my mom's suburban house is a lot weaker than the lock on the vault holding the gold at Fort Knox. Similarly the kind of security appropriate for consumer grade cell phones might be different than the kind appropriate for guarding US national security secrets.

sk5t 11y ago
And you presume that compromising the iPhones belonging to the men and women who do control the nuclear launch codes wouldn't serve to compromise everything they control, by extension? Either by using the data as a lever against the people, or directly snooping, this would be a very powerful opening, and your position seems to defy all common sense.
- harryh 11y ago
  Obama used the word "fetishizing" for a reason. It's a pretty unusual word to use don't you think? It was carefully chosen though I'm sure. Comments like this are exactly why he used it.
  - mhurron 11y ago
    Yes he did use it for a reason. He used it to make it seem perverse that you would want your information on your phone to be secure. Hes is trying, once again, to put forth the governments position that if you're not trying to hide something, you have nothing to fear. And quite frankly, yes, I do hold the security and privacy of data as more important than the terrorism song and dance the government is playing. And I do hold that view absolutely.
ubernostrum 11y ago
Maybe you have information on your phone that KGB is interested in, but most people don't. You have a very narrow view of what information is sensitive. Do you know how many Americans work either directly in, or in industries associated with, defense? How many of them use Apple products as part of their work? Or let's take a more down-to-earth example: I work for a company in the health-care space. We have health records on thousands of people, and as we expand we'll have more health records on more people. With your approach, where should we draw the line? Would it be OK to use security bad enough that, say, an Eastern European organized-crime ring could break in? Or do we need to defend against them and not against the KGB? How do we figure out what level of tools to use to do that? How do we figure out whether what we have now will still be mafia-proof in five years? Oh, and keep in mind that legally we have to protect that data, and improper access to it can not just shut down the company but send me and my co-workers to jail. How much would you be willing to compromise with that on the line? If the potential consequences to you were jail time, how much on the side of Obama and the FBI would you be? How much risk of that would you take on in order to make law enforcement's life a little bit easier? And in case you think this is a red herring, remember the San Bernardino shooter... worked for a public-health department.