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> We need people advocating for the right balance, not just getting each other frustrated. I don't understand this line of thinking regarding the big encryptio

> We need people advocating for the right balance, not just getting each other frustrated. I don't understand this line of thinking regarding the big encryption debate. Yeah it sounds good if you don't know anything about encryption. "Look, he's being reasonable. Why is everyone saying he's wrong instead of striking a balance". The problem is it's a binary problem. There is zero way to strike any type of balance here. You either encrypt communication to prevent others from accessing it or you provide a backdoor or escrow key to access the data in which case all encrypted communications are now insecure. There isn't a middle ground there. If there is I have yet to see anyone suggest it and I can't think of a technical way to do it. Too many attack vectors when you purposefully impose multiple party keys or backdoors.

wpietri 11y ago
In that case, perhaps the balance we need to strike is rhetorical, not technical. I think some people in the tech world are 4th-amendment absolutists. That's not a new thing; in Cryptonomnicon there was the electromagnetic doorframe so strong that it would wipe drives passing through it. I don't know that it's a position I hold myself, but it's one I definitely respect. But we have a multi-century history of the government being able to read people's documents once they have a warrant. A lot of crime-fighting makes use of this. Whatever the intricacies of the technology, there's a status quo that I think we should at least acknowledge. So I think the rhetorical balance we need to strike as an industry is along the lines of, "Yes, we totally get why you would want to get into that terrorist's phone. We wish we could find a way to give you access to just that without compromising everything. But it's not like a wall we can put a special door in. It's like a balloon. The moment it loses integrity, it's worthless. We want to help you, but we can't." When the message instead comes across as absolutist, I think we're in danger of losing public support. Without that, we'll have a very hard time resisting government demands for access.
- BinaryIdiot 11y ago
  Your message can basically be distilled into "it's absolutist but we can't let it come across that way to hurt our PR". I'm not sure trying to increase the complexity of the issue just to make it sound like the technology community doesn't see this as binary is a good solution. I think what we need to do is education people around how encryption works. If we're wishy-washy about the whole thing it may come off as something we can possibly do in the end. I think education is the only way. But that's just my opinion.
  - wpietri 11y ago
    Not quite. Some people on this are absolutists, and some aren't. If we could create a safe back door, some would be in favor of doing that, and some wouldn't. That's distinct from us not having a way to create a safe back door. One problem I see us having (and I've seen this on Facebook) is that some people think that we are saying we can't create a safe back door because we don't want to. And I think they're getting that notion because of the people in the absolutist camp.
    - BinaryIdiot 11y ago
      > If we could create a safe back door, some would be in favor of doing that, and some wouldn't. That's distinct from us not having a way to create a safe back door. I've seen a tiny handful of comments like that and other comments about how they're fine if it isn't completely safe in order to "protect the country". Is there any data to even know for sure what the majority of common people think about encryption and backdoors? I'm not convinced a near majority simply thinks that SV just "doesn't want to". Well except in maybe the current Apple vs FBI case as the FBI and some of the media are kinda shouting that. Perhaps that'll sway the tides and make more people think in that way, however? Either way I still think trying to educate the populous is the best way to undermine the entire idea of escrow keys / backdoors.
      - wpietri 11y ago
        I don't think a "near majority" needs to think that for this to be a useful approach. When people can't engage on the substance, they fall back on human heuristics. E.g., bedside manner is important in doctors because people will generally stop listening to doctors they don't find trustworthy. You're welcome to try to educate the populace on the subtleties of crypto. My guess is that the number of people who will sit still for that is pretty small, but maybe I'm wrong. In case I'm right, though, I think a useful backup would be displaying empathy for the (reasonable) societal goals that are driving this push for back doors.
ecma 11y ago
I didn't think I'd come back but I liked your comment and wanted to rebut. There is a middle ground and where it lies is directly related to the assessed risk. To support a mechanism is a binary choice but its design is not. In the San Bernardino example, an unexpected potential adversary (Apple) has emerged. An unexpected vector is being discussed which has nothing to do with the encryption mechanism itself. Perfect cryptography doesn't imply a perfect cryptosystem and it sure doesn't imply perfect privacy. The balance that needs to be found is around the assistance which is rendered to warranted agencies to enable their access to data. IMO vendor supported key material attacks are not an unreasonable solution but obviously that mechanism can go horribly wrong if the software is leaked and it is not adequately designed. The same can be said for signed updates in general though. This is a hard technical problem but it's not a binary choice where the agency has some magic key they can use wherever they want or they have nothing. If they can be enabled on a case by case basis such that it is cost effective for them to do the rest, that might be enough. Obviously this is all based on the assumption of a robust local judicial process. However, whatever decision making process occurs needs to take into account global implications. Other commenters here and elsewhere have mentioned what this could mean for agencies in other countries where judicial process may be less robust. Many have commented about a lack of transparency in our own. This is a separate but very closely related concern. There are also considerations for the open source community and how precedent like this might be applied to them. It's a hard problem but it's not binary.
- BinaryIdiot 11y ago
  > The balance that needs to be found is around the assistance which is rendered to warranted agencies to enable their access to data. IMO vendor supported key material attacks are not an unreasonable solution[...]If they can be enabled on a case by case basis such that it is cost effective for them to do the rest, that might be enough. Why is it not unreasonable? You're compelling companies to write custom software explicitly for law enforcement use. Let's say you own a company that creates product X. Now the FBI is compelling you, through the court system, to develop a completely custom version of product X to let them access it or use it in some way. Sure they're paying you but you now have to redirect resources to handle this and you likely hired people to do things other than work on a government project. This ultimately can hurt your company and its market position simply by consuming your resources. This is unprecedented outside of war times. It's hard for me to imagine anyone being okay with compelling a company to become a government contractor. > It's a hard problem but it's not binary. It absolutely is. The "middle ground" you pointed to isn't a middle ground; it's unconstitutional. I have yet to hear a technically viable AND constitutional "middle ground" in this debate.

wpietri 11y ago

In that case, perhaps the balance we need to strike is rhetorical, not technical. I think some people in the tech world are 4th-amendment absolutists. That's not a new thing; in Cryptonomnicon there was the electromagnetic doorframe so strong that it would wipe drives passing through it. I don't know that it's a position I hold myself, but it's one I definitely respect. But we have a multi-century history of the government being able to read people's documents once they have a warrant. A lot of crime-fighting makes use of this. Whatever the intricacies of the technology, there's a status quo that I think we should at least acknowledge. So I think the rhetorical balance we need to strike as an industry is along the lines of, "Yes, we totally get why you would want to get into that terrorist's phone. We wish we could find a way to give you access to just that without compromising everything. But it's not like a wall we can put a special door in. It's like a balloon. The moment it loses integrity, it's worthless. We want to help you, but we can't." When the message instead comes across as absolutist, I think we're in danger of losing public support. Without that, we'll have a very hard time resisting government demands for access.

BinaryIdiot 11y ago
Your message can basically be distilled into "it's absolutist but we can't let it come across that way to hurt our PR". I'm not sure trying to increase the complexity of the issue just to make it sound like the technology community doesn't see this as binary is a good solution. I think what we need to do is education people around how encryption works. If we're wishy-washy about the whole thing it may come off as something we can possibly do in the end. I think education is the only way. But that's just my opinion.
- wpietri 11y ago
  Not quite. Some people on this are absolutists, and some aren't. If we could create a safe back door, some would be in favor of doing that, and some wouldn't. That's distinct from us not having a way to create a safe back door. One problem I see us having (and I've seen this on Facebook) is that some people think that we are saying we can't create a safe back door because we don't want to. And I think they're getting that notion because of the people in the absolutist camp.
  - BinaryIdiot 11y ago
    > If we could create a safe back door, some would be in favor of doing that, and some wouldn't. That's distinct from us not having a way to create a safe back door. I've seen a tiny handful of comments like that and other comments about how they're fine if it isn't completely safe in order to "protect the country". Is there any data to even know for sure what the majority of common people think about encryption and backdoors? I'm not convinced a near majority simply thinks that SV just "doesn't want to". Well except in maybe the current Apple vs FBI case as the FBI and some of the media are kinda shouting that. Perhaps that'll sway the tides and make more people think in that way, however? Either way I still think trying to educate the populous is the best way to undermine the entire idea of escrow keys / backdoors.
    - wpietri 11y ago
      I don't think a "near majority" needs to think that for this to be a useful approach. When people can't engage on the substance, they fall back on human heuristics. E.g., bedside manner is important in doctors because people will generally stop listening to doctors they don't find trustworthy. You're welcome to try to educate the populace on the subtleties of crypto. My guess is that the number of people who will sit still for that is pretty small, but maybe I'm wrong. In case I'm right, though, I think a useful backup would be displaying empathy for the (reasonable) societal goals that are driving this push for back doors.

ecma 11y ago

I didn't think I'd come back but I liked your comment and wanted to rebut. There is a middle ground and where it lies is directly related to the assessed risk. To support a mechanism is a binary choice but its design is not. In the San Bernardino example, an unexpected potential adversary (Apple) has emerged. An unexpected vector is being discussed which has nothing to do with the encryption mechanism itself. Perfect cryptography doesn't imply a perfect cryptosystem and it sure doesn't imply perfect privacy. The balance that needs to be found is around the assistance which is rendered to warranted agencies to enable their access to data. IMO vendor supported key material attacks are not an unreasonable solution but obviously that mechanism can go horribly wrong if the software is leaked and it is not adequately designed. The same can be said for signed updates in general though. This is a hard technical problem but it's not a binary choice where the agency has some magic key they can use wherever they want or they have nothing. If they can be enabled on a case by case basis such that it is cost effective for them to do the rest, that might be enough. Obviously this is all based on the assumption of a robust local judicial process. However, whatever decision making process occurs needs to take into account global implications. Other commenters here and elsewhere have mentioned what this could mean for agencies in other countries where judicial process may be less robust. Many have commented about a lack of transparency in our own. This is a separate but very closely related concern. There are also considerations for the open source community and how precedent like this might be applied to them. It's a hard problem but it's not binary.

BinaryIdiot 11y ago
> The balance that needs to be found is around the assistance which is rendered to warranted agencies to enable their access to data. IMO vendor supported key material attacks are not an unreasonable solution[...]If they can be enabled on a case by case basis such that it is cost effective for them to do the rest, that might be enough. Why is it not unreasonable? You're compelling companies to write custom software explicitly for law enforcement use. Let's say you own a company that creates product X. Now the FBI is compelling you, through the court system, to develop a completely custom version of product X to let them access it or use it in some way. Sure they're paying you but you now have to redirect resources to handle this and you likely hired people to do things other than work on a government project. This ultimately can hurt your company and its market position simply by consuming your resources. This is unprecedented outside of war times. It's hard for me to imagine anyone being okay with compelling a company to become a government contractor. > It's a hard problem but it's not binary. It absolutely is. The "middle ground" you pointed to isn't a middle ground; it's unconstitutional. I have yet to hear a technically viable AND constitutional "middle ground" in this debate.