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I think: First, basic income is a simple concept. Anyone can understand the idea. The idea is that everyone gets a check. Everyone. (The reality: It probably w
by Mz 11y ago
I think:
First, basic income is a simple concept. Anyone can understand the idea. The idea is that everyone gets a check. Everyone. (The reality: It probably won't work that way.) Taxes are complicated and poorly understood and so on.
Second, I think a lot of people are incredibly scared right now. I have seen articles from very wealthy people about how afraid they are for the world these days. A great many people are afraid that automation is "taking our jobs" and that if we do not simply cut a check for everyone, vast swaths of people will be left out and there is just a lot of fear right now.
The world is more complicated than ever. An elegant solution in the face of that level of complexity is hard for many people to envision, much less fathom.
(For the record: I am not for basic income. I am for 1) Affordable housing and 2) making "gig work" a path to a real middle class income.)
- derefr 11y agoI don't see why we can't build such systems from simple elegant "mechanism" cores (like true 100%-of-population UBI) and then put "policy"-based compensatory mechanisms atop them, rather than mining policy and mechanism in every single thing the government does. I.e., in this case, everyone gets a check from one (small) department; and then that check is treated as income, and so another (large) department will take some varying amount of it away, along with the rest of income. Seems far better than trying to optimize treasury-need vs personal-need during both the giving and the taking-away steps.
- Mz 11y agoI have written about this before and, in a nutshell, there are problems inherent in cutting everyone a check. If you literally give everyone a check starting from birth, you will almost certainly see poor women cranking out babies to increase their own income and they will not be good mothers and they will not raise children who are decent human beings, prepared to contribute to the world. One of my previous blog posts about my objections too ubi: http://micheleincalifornia.blogspot.com/2015/09/it-was-obsolete-before-we-opened.html http://micheleincalifornia.blogspot.com/2015/09/it-was-obsol...
- derefr 11y agoI agree that there are problems if we just add UBI on top of the current system. But that doesn't go against my point—we can set up a mechanism (give everyone money) and then write policy assuming that mechanism (e.g. pass laws about children's income requiring it to go into trusts, where any money being spent by the parents requires a new Financial Auditing branch of Child Protective Services to do a check that the money is being spent for the child's best interests.) The important thing is that the latter step is general: it safeguards the interests of children who get any kind of income, including child actors, child competitive-tournament winners, etc. If this were just part of the decision process of granting the money as income in the first place, then these side-benefits would be left unrealized. It's the same as the mechanism/policy separation of Internet infrastructure: instead of trying to create a physical-layer transport with perfect reliability, we create a simple physical-layer transport (Ethernet) and then reliability is a policy decision made at a higher level, compensating for a physical layer where "potential unreliability" is taken as axiomatic. We should strive for "foundational" laws that set up universal systems of incentives—because that lets us predict how society will shift in aggregate. Then, having done so, we should be able to write specific, ephemeral laws that assume such incentives exist, and then create multiplicative or countervailing forces to shift those incentives for the specific case. The one obvious example of where the law does this is in terms of inalienable rights. The constitution "grants" them universally (though the language is more like "these rights are already axiomatic in the cultural fabric, and we're just making them explicit in law so they can be pointed at.") Then, legislation and caselaw just work in terms of them, layering new things above and around them to achieve an effect, rather than being able to say anything like "and in this case, [some right] doesn't apply." For any given area of policy, having a low-level non-changeable core policy that can always be trusted to be true—and then a high-level set of situational laws to attenuate the output of that core, rather than overriding it—is both easier to legislate, easier to adjudicate, easier to enforce, and easier to learn. Everyone including later policy-makers can know and rely on the core policy always applying, so they don't have to worry; there's no combinatoric explosion of "if we add this, then will that other thing that was intended to be countervailing now go too far when this branch of the core decision tree is taken?" Instead, we just get the equivalent of D&D's "non-stackable bonuses": an explicit notion of a "non-core law" (like a notion of a "bonus") where the core law can set meta-policy on how policies combine.