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> Please try to keep up... The signed build does not need to be limited to a single device... The FBI allows Apple to keep the build themselves and delete it af
by simoncion 11y ago
> Please try to keep up... The signed build does not need to be limited to a single device... The FBI allows Apple to keep the build themselves and delete it after use.
You misunderstand what business this safe manufacturer is in. He's in the business of high-security safes. Any bypass technique he comes up with must be as specific as possible, and defended in every way possible, lest he fail his customers [0] and destroy his reputation (and -thus- his entire business) as a high-security safe manufacturer.
So, yes, the technique developed must be limited -as far as is possible- to a single safe (or phone). Anyone who reads HN knows that leaks happen. The more valuable a piece of information, the more likely someone with the ability to snatch it will be targeting it. And -as we should all know by now- it's tremendously difficult to prevent a state-level actor from acquiring data that's not very securely locked away.
Again, if you're in the business of providing high-security services to your clients, you are going to ensure that any bypass mechanism you're forced to make is as difficult to create and one-time-use as possible.
[0] And -in some jurisdictions- aid in the "legal" torture, imprisonment, or death of his customers.
- lern_too_spel 11y agoThe way to make it difficult to reuse is to keep it at Apple (where nobody can extract it from the device) and dispose of it after use, not try to limit it to a single device and allow the build to leak. The signing key is much more valuable target than this build, and the build needs to be secured for a very limited time.