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They can. The arguments are over whether the FBI has the legal standing to compel Apple to create code to do that, and what precedent, legal or otherwise, it s

They can. The arguments are over whether the FBI has the legal standing to compel Apple to create code to do that, and what precedent, legal or otherwise, it sets for similar cases.

jgalt212 11y ago
Can the FBI compel a bank to open a safe deposit box? Can a bank be compelled to identify the names on a numbered account? If they can, then Apple can be compelled to deliver the goods on these terrorists. If not, then no. I really don't see this issue as all that complex.
- Gracana 11y ago
  A bank doesn't have to spend time developing a product to allow the door to be opened. They just open the door. That's not the case here with Apple.
  - jgalt212 11y ago
    True, but the first time they did blast open a safe deposit box, I bet there was significant time and expense involved. Now it's just a known process.
    - chrishas35 11y ago
      Doesn't take a lot of time and expense to figure out how to use a drill...
- thwarted 11y ago
  I really don't see this issue as all that complex. It's always the issues that don't seem all that complex that end up coming back and biting us in the ass.
- mortenjorck 11y ago
  One can make any complex issue simple with a blunt enough analogy. That's why analogies are great for introducing a concept and poor for drawing conclusions about them.
- calgoo 11y ago
  Its more like: Can the FBI compel a safe deposit box maker to add a master key to all boxes so that they can open one when they need too.
  - lern_too_spel 11y ago
    It's more like if the safe deposit maker already has a master key that is harder to use than a normal key but can still open the safe in a day, can a judge compel the safe deposit maker to use that key on the FBI's behalf?
    - lygaret 11y ago
      Even that example's not quite right; it's the judge compelling the safe deposit maker to _give_ the key to the FBI, such that they can use it in perpetuity.
      - empressplay 11y ago
        The order explicitly states Apple will keep possession of the modified software at all times. Nobody would be "giving the key" to the FBI.
    - st3v3r 11y ago
      No, they don't.
      - lern_too_spel 11y ago
        Yes, they do, or the FBI wouldn't bother Apple with a request, and if the FBI sent a request anyway, Apple would say it is impossible. The FBI sent Apple a request, and Apple didn't say the request was impossible, so Apple has what amounts to a backdoor (really, a front door).
  - reacweb 11y ago
    Very good analogy. We all know the fate of TSA keys.
- nihonde 11y ago
  A better analogy is whether the FBI can compel your doctor to develop and then administer a medical procedure that allows them to extract 'unencrypted' thoughts from your brain against your will.
  - lern_too_spel 11y ago
    There are laws that protect people against self-incrimination in most countries, so that analogy doesn't work, but if a doctor can uniquely perform a procedure that can help an investigation because of some relation to the person under investigation, she can be compelled to perform that procedure in most countries, including the US.
    - nihonde 11y ago
      You're not wrong about the Fifth Amendment, but you're assuming the compelled testimony is self-incriminating. What if the FBI decides to round up all the people in the area of a crime, and coerce a doctor to administer some "thought extraction" procedure that would offer evidence of the culprit? If one of the witnesses turned out to be the perpetrator, their testimony would be unconstitutional, but the other witnesses would (in theory) be valid and admissible. In fact, our friends at the CIA have given this prospect plenty of consideration: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol5no2/html/v05i2a09p_0001.htm https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intellig...
- unabridged 11y ago
  It is closer to a safe designer (Apple) who sells a safe that destroys its contents when broken into. And the state compelling the safe designer to participate in cracking it open.
  - lern_too_spel 11y ago
    That's the closest non-digital analogy I have seen yet. To make it closer, the safe designer has a code to disable the autodestruct mechanism that nobody else has.
    - simoncion 11y ago
      > ...the safe designer has a code to disable the autodestruct mechanism that nobody else has. No, not quite. The safe designer can more easily figure out how to bypass his autodestruct mechanisms than anyone else, but that doesn't mean that he "has a code" that bypasses them. In this analogy, it's still nontrivial for the safe designer to perform the work, but it's (probably) easier for him than for anyone else.
      - lern_too_spel 11y ago
        It takes a day of work to use this code to disable the autodestruct, but that doesn't really change anything. That they have this code (that nobody else has) at all is the main reason a judge can force the safe maker to assist with the investigation.
        simoncion 11y ago
        > That they have this code... They don't have any bypass code. They have detailed plans for the autodestruct mechanism. That's it. They are probably the entity on the planet with the best understanding of the autodestruct system, but the autodestruct system does not have an "off" switch. To reverse the analogy: The safe designer's bypass "code" is analogous to a back door already built into iOS that opens when presented with some information held in secret by Apple. (Think CALEA wiretapping infrastructure built into US-destined telecom infrastructure equipment.) Because Apple has to write a special version of iOS to fulfil FedGov's request, we can reasonably assume that there is no pre-built back door in iOS that sits around, awaiting the secret information.

They can. The arguments are over whether the FBI has the legal standing to compel Apple to create code to do that, and what precedent, legal or otherwise, it sets for similar cases.

jgalt212 11y ago

Can the FBI compel a bank to open a safe deposit box? Can a bank be compelled to identify the names on a numbered account? If they can, then Apple can be compelled to deliver the goods on these terrorists. If not, then no. I really don't see this issue as all that complex.

Gracana 11y ago
A bank doesn't have to spend time developing a product to allow the door to be opened. They just open the door. That's not the case here with Apple.
- jgalt212 11y ago
  True, but the first time they did blast open a safe deposit box, I bet there was significant time and expense involved. Now it's just a known process.
  - chrishas35 11y ago
    Doesn't take a lot of time and expense to figure out how to use a drill...
thwarted 11y ago
I really don't see this issue as all that complex. It's always the issues that don't seem all that complex that end up coming back and biting us in the ass.
mortenjorck 11y ago
One can make any complex issue simple with a blunt enough analogy. That's why analogies are great for introducing a concept and poor for drawing conclusions about them.
calgoo 11y ago
Its more like: Can the FBI compel a safe deposit box maker to add a master key to all boxes so that they can open one when they need too.
- lern_too_spel 11y ago
  It's more like if the safe deposit maker already has a master key that is harder to use than a normal key but can still open the safe in a day, can a judge compel the safe deposit maker to use that key on the FBI's behalf?
  - lygaret 11y ago
    Even that example's not quite right; it's the judge compelling the safe deposit maker to _give_ the key to the FBI, such that they can use it in perpetuity.
    - empressplay 11y ago
      The order explicitly states Apple will keep possession of the modified software at all times. Nobody would be "giving the key" to the FBI.
  - st3v3r 11y ago
    No, they don't.
    - lern_too_spel 11y ago
      Yes, they do, or the FBI wouldn't bother Apple with a request, and if the FBI sent a request anyway, Apple would say it is impossible. The FBI sent Apple a request, and Apple didn't say the request was impossible, so Apple has what amounts to a backdoor (really, a front door).
- reacweb 11y ago
  Very good analogy. We all know the fate of TSA keys.
nihonde 11y ago
A better analogy is whether the FBI can compel your doctor to develop and then administer a medical procedure that allows them to extract 'unencrypted' thoughts from your brain against your will.
- lern_too_spel 11y ago
  There are laws that protect people against self-incrimination in most countries, so that analogy doesn't work, but if a doctor can uniquely perform a procedure that can help an investigation because of some relation to the person under investigation, she can be compelled to perform that procedure in most countries, including the US.
  - nihonde 11y ago
    You're not wrong about the Fifth Amendment, but you're assuming the compelled testimony is self-incriminating. What if the FBI decides to round up all the people in the area of a crime, and coerce a doctor to administer some "thought extraction" procedure that would offer evidence of the culprit? If one of the witnesses turned out to be the perpetrator, their testimony would be unconstitutional, but the other witnesses would (in theory) be valid and admissible. In fact, our friends at the CIA have given this prospect plenty of consideration: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol5no2/html/v05i2a09p_0001.htm https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intellig...
unabridged 11y ago
It is closer to a safe designer (Apple) who sells a safe that destroys its contents when broken into. And the state compelling the safe designer to participate in cracking it open.
- lern_too_spel 11y ago
  That's the closest non-digital analogy I have seen yet. To make it closer, the safe designer has a code to disable the autodestruct mechanism that nobody else has.
  - simoncion 11y ago
    > ...the safe designer has a code to disable the autodestruct mechanism that nobody else has. No, not quite. The safe designer can more easily figure out how to bypass his autodestruct mechanisms than anyone else, but that doesn't mean that he "has a code" that bypasses them. In this analogy, it's still nontrivial for the safe designer to perform the work, but it's (probably) easier for him than for anyone else.
    - lern_too_spel 11y ago
      It takes a day of work to use this code to disable the autodestruct, but that doesn't really change anything. That they have this code (that nobody else has) at all is the main reason a judge can force the safe maker to assist with the investigation.
      - simoncion 11y ago
        > That they have this code... They don't have any bypass code. They have detailed plans for the autodestruct mechanism. That's it. They are probably the entity on the planet with the best understanding of the autodestruct system, but the autodestruct system does not have an "off" switch. To reverse the analogy: The safe designer's bypass "code" is analogous to a back door already built into iOS that opens when presented with some information held in secret by Apple. (Think CALEA wiretapping infrastructure built into US-destined telecom infrastructure equipment.) Because Apple has to write a special version of iOS to fulfil FedGov's request, we can reasonably assume that there is no pre-built back door in iOS that sits around, awaiting the secret information.