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Most people download software from websites using GUI browsers, while performing a checksum generally requires opening a terminal, changing directories to where
by rcthompson 11y ago
Most people download software from websites using GUI browsers, while performing a checksum generally requires opening a terminal, changing directories to where the file was downloaded, and running the checksum program there. Maybe the web browser should provide a UI for doing checksums directly in the download manager. For example, each download entry could have a blank "checksum" text box where you can paste in the checksum given on the page.
- CiPHPerCoder 11y agoThis doesn't solve the problem. At all. A checksum is NOT a substitute for a digital signature. https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/08/you-wouldnt-base64-a-password-cryptography-decoded https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/08/you-wouldnt-base64-a-pass...
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- Hydraulix989 11y agoRight. All I have to do is distribute the correct hash for my binary as a malicious software distributor because there's no authenticity verification at all, only that the bits in my binary blob match a certain pattern.
- rhizome 11y agoIs that supposed to be sarcasm? Hard to tell.
- CiPHPerCoder 11y agoI suspect not.
- __david__ 11y agoIt is given the following attack scenario: attacker is man-in-the-middling, and the SHA (but not the actual binary) is delivered via https. In the case where the attacked has direct control over the website then you're right, it doesn't help at all.
- CiPHPerCoder 11y ago> In the case where the attacked has direct control over the website then you're right, it doesn't help at all. I was pretty sure that's the threat model we were discussing: Software authenticity. The only way to automatically know if a piece of software is legitimate is to have a trusted public key that can verify a signature. Also, HTTPS is implied these days. If you're not using HTTPS, you are either malicious, negligent, incompetent, or working for someone who is some or all of the above.
- __david__ 11y ago> If you're not using HTTPS, you are either malicious, negligent, incompetent… Or poor. Hosting large amounts of binaries over https isn't cheap. I just priced Amazon S3 and cloudfront and for the amount of data that I serve it would cost $300 per month. That's a lot to commit for a GPL-ed binary that brings in practically zero revenue. Maybe there's a cut rate VPS out there that can handle 150GB of data and 3TB of bandwidth per month on the cheap, but I haven't found it yet.
- kruczek 11y agoHow much is it for the same volume of non-HTTPS traffic?
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- saganus 11y agoThat would be a useful extension/plugin for browsers actually. Maybe like pointed out in another reply, not for checksums but for signatures. So you just copy/paste the signature after selecting a file, and then it can verify it's validity. Is there no such extension yet? it seems like there should be one already.
- ikeboy 11y agoTried to search, found https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/bootstrapping/extension/ https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/bootstrapping/extension/, and links to https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/satori/oncomejlklhkbffpdhpmhldlfambmjlf https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/satori/oncomejlklh..., with code at https://github.com/glamrock/satori https://github.com/glamrock/satori
- TickleSteve 11y agoyeah, maybe they should call it something like.... https??
- toyg 11y agoMaybe something like: - have a database of common downloads and all their crypto info, which developers can update once they are validated - have browser extensions that will check packages on download and alert if suspicious You could pay for it with some sort of sponsorship from apps themselves, who have an interest in not getting compromised like this (it's terrible publicity).