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This will come as no surprise to anyone who has studied game theory. The rational move in a prisoner's dilemma if you know (or control) when the game will end
by lisper 11y ago
This will come as no surprise to anyone who has studied game theory. The rational move in a prisoner's dilemma if you know (or control) when the game will end is to defect. This is also why term limits don't work.
- dragonwriter 11y ago> This is also why term limits don't work. Its a limit on the utility of term limits where the term limited officer is unlikely to seek another elective office when termed out, but that concern does not apply to most holders of term-limited positions (it does apply to the US President, which tends to be someone's last elected position, but state legislators, for instance, often seek other, usually higher, offices with constituencies overlapping those of their prior office when termed-out, and so the concern doesn't really apply to them.)
- lisper 11y agoActually, it does apply because there are vastly fewer higher positions than lower ones. Most politicians who term-out go into private industry, and they know it.
- dllthomas 11y ago> The rational move in a prisoner's dilemma if you know (or control) when the game will end is to defect. Can't they always control when they stop running for office?
- lisper 11y agoYes, of course. The implication here is that someone would stop running in order to enable a defection, but that's a fallacy. People can (and do) defect for reasons other than knowing when the game will end. The problem is not the defections per se (those happen all the time), it's the fact that if the end of your term is known then not only does that force you to defect (if you are rational), it also forces everyone else to defect if they are rational.