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Thanks for the excellent summary. "The big problem here is that people run old SSLv2 servers with the same RSA keypairs as their TLS servers. So you can take m
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
Thanks for the excellent summary.
"The big problem here is that people run old SSLv2 servers with the same RSA keypairs as their TLS servers. So you can take messages you captured from the TLS servers, and, with some very clever message manipulation owing to an older Bardou paper, make them intelligible to SSLv2, and use the SSLv2 padding oracle to decrypt them."
That is a lesson worth remembering: something acquired in one context might become valuable in an attack in another context. I've seen this concept show up repeatedly hacking and security analysis. Clever how this attack applied it.
I've occasionally wondered if that could be turned into some mental framework or heuristics for generically applying it to various security analyses. Some systematic way, maybe semi-automated, of saying we've collected all these pieces of information for protocols, configs, etc. Now what does that automatically infer in terms of attacks or even connections that might lead to them?
Not sure that it's feasible in general case. I used it in prototype security scanners before the commercial ones showed up. Might be something to be had researching the concept further. (shrugs)