Diverse Double Compiling is a proven solution to the On Trusting Trust problem [0]. So, if a package maintainer signs a package and posts that signature on an h

Diverse Double Compiling is a proven solution to the On Trusting Trust problem [0]. So, if a package maintainer signs a package and posts that signature on an https page, I can have a high level of confidence that the software I compile and run on my machine is identical. Here is some advice from Schneier on running secure software against a state-level adversary [1][2]. However, even that is not immune from a black bag job [3]. [0] http://www.dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/ http://www.dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/ [1] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/air_gaps.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/air_gaps.html [2] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/tails.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/tails.html [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_bag_operation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_bag_operation