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> It would make much more sense to add a "user mode" option for the likes of apt-get, whereby it does not need sudo and it will install the specified package in
by pdonis 11y ago
> It would make much more sense to add a "user mode" option for the likes of apt-get, whereby it does not need sudo and it will install the specified package in ~/bin, ~/usr etc, symlinking necessary libraries.
And then any random piece of malware running in your browser can in principle hose all your applications. There's a very good reason that ordinary users do not have write access to application binaries on Linux.
- toyg 11y agoIt would hose only your "usermode" apps, which would be a small subset -- likely smaller unpopular apps that lag in the distro repository. The system as a whole would remain intact, so you can logoff and clean up the mess as root. What hack would rely on some specific app being deployed in user-mode anyway? To do what, steal user files it already has access to? It's obvious that "usermode" should be the exception and not the norm, but from a security standpoint it's exactly the same as compiling and installing with custom prefixes.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- pdonis 11y ago> It would hose only your "usermode" apps, which would be a small subset Until more and more user apps start to get out of sync with the "system" versions of things, and therefore need to be installed with the "user" option in order to work. > What hack would rely on some specific app being deployed in user-mode anyway? A hack that doesn't care about specific apps but just wants to compromise whatever it can. Like, you know, a virus. > To do what, steal user files it already has access to? And send them to the Internet, without your knowledge. Like viruses already do--only it's a lot harder to get them to run on Linux. At least, it is now.
- zanny 11y agoAny proposal of untrusted user level software installation will require, to be legitimate, a well implemented MAC solution to the program. Android actually demonstrates this fairly well using SELinux and app permissions. New software could present its access requests to the user, to be approved or not. Unapproved or undocumented accesses are also displayed as notifications, where declining the running apps access becomes a permanent rule. Of course, to standardize such a system across distros, either you need an abstraction layer access management syntax, or you have to get everyone to agree to one of SELinux / Grsec / Tomoyo / Apparmor. Really though I think the obvious answer is that ten years from now we have something like xdg-app shipping generic usage filters and mandating userspace MAC on new programs, along with an xdg -> distro specific library mapping layer from something like appstream.