5 ms·

I now live in America but I know little about laws. Let's forget about Apple and technology. Let's say that the gunman had a safe in his apartment. FBI can't o

by DAddYE 11y ago

I now live in America but I know little about laws. Let's forget about Apple and technology. Let's say that the gunman had a safe in his apartment. FBI can't open it without destroying its content. FBI (like in others countries) can ask the Company who made the safe for help to open it and that company should help them to do so at its best. If that company is unable to open the safe, is it admissible (under the current laws) to ask the Company to make a master key?

studentrob 11y ago
Please read more about this case and inform yourself. Creating or giving that master key, Cook says, will put every device owner at risk. And given that there are millions of iPhone users worldwide, that risk is huge.
- lttlrck 11y ago
  I think you may have misread.
- davidw 11y ago
  Apple already has a master code signing key.
  - studentrob 11y ago
    Yes and handing over signed code is not something Apple should be compelled to do.
    - davidw 11y ago
      My understanding is that no one is asking them to do so.
      - studentrob 11y ago
        Let me rephrase. Creating signed software that Apple feels is unsafe and not something Apple should be compelled to do. Additionally, we all know very well that eventually law enforcement will demand their own copy of the software, or find it with the help of the NSA. By the way, I'm totally with you that Apple should improve the security of their phones. But this case and that feature are separate issues. You can advocate open hardware & software and defend Apple's stand against the government compelling companies to act at the same time. Those ideas are not mutually exclusive. Hate the game not the player.
        davidw 11y ago
        If they ask for the software, Apple should deny that request because that's very different from asking for assistance on a case-by-case basis with a court order for each one. The question reasonable, non-technical people are going to ask is: how is this different than asking to search a house. There's a court order, it's not just the FBI acting on its own. They're asking Apple to do it, and not hand over a master key, which would not be reasonable at all.
        studentrob 11y ago
        Somehow Apple has managed to keep its signing key from getting out into the wild. Only Apple knows the systems required to keep that safe. The same cannot be said of signed copies of software. > If they ask for the software, Apple should deny that request because that's very different from asking for assistance on a case-by-case basis with a court order for each one. If it comes to that, I'm sure they will put up the same fight. What's the difference to you whether they fight now or later? Must Apple act exactly as you would? > The question reasonable, non-technical people are going to ask is: how is this different than asking to search a house. There's a court order, it's not just the FBI acting on its own. They're asking Apple to do it, and not hand over a master key, which would not be reasonable at all. To those reasonable, non-technical people I would say the following: "If we create special signed software for the government for unlocking the iPhone, then terrorists will just use something else that is out of the reach of our government. We will have weakened our privacy and this will not keep us safe from terrorism. If the signed software gets into the wrong hands, it could be used by anyone in the world to hack into iPhones and get location data on your kids, your home, and other information you'd rather keep private."
_rknLA 11y ago
It's unclear if you're trolling, but assuming you're not, the analogy doesn't work because digital things and physical things behave in fundamentally different ways. In the physical example, according to the FBI's "just this one iPhone" claim, one would reasonably expect that the company could then destroy the hypothetical master key as soon as it's used. This makes sense in a physical world, but the analogy breaks down completely in a digital world. [Returning your spider doesn't solve the problem](http://www.27bslash6.com/overdue.html http://www.27bslash6.com/overdue.html). In the digital world, you can't guarantee that the key hasn't been copied, and you can't guarantee that destroying the "original instance" of the key destroys all others. The custom OS that the FBI is asking Apple to build will also take development time, and likely take more than one person to develop, meaning that if there's a security breach during the OS's development, any number of intermediate builds may also be stolen during development, before the FBI can even access the particular phone in question.
- rhino369 11y ago
  >In the physical example, according to the FBI's "just this one iPhone" claim, one would reasonably expect that the company could then destroy the hypothetical master key as soon as it's used. This makes sense in a physical world, but the analogy breaks down completely in a digital world. Why not? Can't apple just delete it? >In the digital world, you can't guarantee that the key hasn't been copied, and you can't guarantee that destroying the "original instance" of the key destroys all others. You can't do that in the physical world either. But you can be pretty damn certain that it isn't done. >The custom OS that the FBI is asking Apple to build will also take development time, and likely take more than one person to develop, meaning that if there's a security breach during the OS's development, any number of intermediate builds may also be stolen during development, before the FBI can even access the particular phone in question. Apple already takes this risk with every since iOS release.
  - _rknLA 11y ago
    Yes, but leaks of pre-release iOS software can't be installed on locked phones as a means of unlocking them, so the risk is not nearly the same. If you really want to carry this analogy to term, fine, I'll concede that you can't be 100% sure that a physical key wasn't copied before you destroy it, but then you must take into consideration the complexity of manufacture and duplication - if the complexity of duplication is high, and you only make one, and guard it at all times, you can have a fairly high confidence (barring ridiculous film plots) that the key you're destroying is the only one. With digital things, the complexity of duplication is beyond trivial. One copy leaks, and instantly there are tens of thousands, if not millions of copies in all corners of the internet. Physical objects simply do not behave this way.
kelnos 11y ago
is it admissible (under the current laws) to ask the Company to make a master key? That's exactly what's under debate. The FBI believes the All Writs Act does allow that, and Apple (and many others) disagree. The safe analogy is a bit flawed[1], but to play it out, the debate is over whether or not a company should be allowed to build and sell an uncrackable safe. Law enforcement appears to say no, and privacy advocates say yes. [1] ... since if you build a safe that's actually uncrackable, it's by definition impossible to later modify it so it will accept some sort of master key, whereas adding software to allow disabling the passcode prompt on a phone is doable after it's built.

by DAddYE 11y ago

studentrob 11y ago

Please read more about this case and inform yourself. Creating or giving that master key, Cook says, will put every device owner at risk. And given that there are millions of iPhone users worldwide, that risk is huge.

lttlrck 11y ago
I think you may have misread.
davidw 11y ago
Apple already has a master code signing key.
- studentrob 11y ago
  Yes and handing over signed code is not something Apple should be compelled to do.
  - davidw 11y ago
    My understanding is that no one is asking them to do so.
    - studentrob 11y ago
      Let me rephrase. Creating signed software that Apple feels is unsafe and not something Apple should be compelled to do. Additionally, we all know very well that eventually law enforcement will demand their own copy of the software, or find it with the help of the NSA. By the way, I'm totally with you that Apple should improve the security of their phones. But this case and that feature are separate issues. You can advocate open hardware & software and defend Apple's stand against the government compelling companies to act at the same time. Those ideas are not mutually exclusive. Hate the game not the player.
      - davidw 11y ago
        If they ask for the software, Apple should deny that request because that's very different from asking for assistance on a case-by-case basis with a court order for each one. The question reasonable, non-technical people are going to ask is: how is this different than asking to search a house. There's a court order, it's not just the FBI acting on its own. They're asking Apple to do it, and not hand over a master key, which would not be reasonable at all.
        studentrob 11y ago
        Somehow Apple has managed to keep its signing key from getting out into the wild. Only Apple knows the systems required to keep that safe. The same cannot be said of signed copies of software. > If they ask for the software, Apple should deny that request because that's very different from asking for assistance on a case-by-case basis with a court order for each one. If it comes to that, I'm sure they will put up the same fight. What's the difference to you whether they fight now or later? Must Apple act exactly as you would? > The question reasonable, non-technical people are going to ask is: how is this different than asking to search a house. There's a court order, it's not just the FBI acting on its own. They're asking Apple to do it, and not hand over a master key, which would not be reasonable at all. To those reasonable, non-technical people I would say the following: "If we create special signed software for the government for unlocking the iPhone, then terrorists will just use something else that is out of the reach of our government. We will have weakened our privacy and this will not keep us safe from terrorism. If the signed software gets into the wrong hands, it could be used by anyone in the world to hack into iPhones and get location data on your kids, your home, and other information you'd rather keep private."

_rknLA 11y ago

It's unclear if you're trolling, but assuming you're not, the analogy doesn't work because digital things and physical things behave in fundamentally different ways. In the physical example, according to the FBI's "just this one iPhone" claim, one would reasonably expect that the company could then destroy the hypothetical master key as soon as it's used. This makes sense in a physical world, but the analogy breaks down completely in a digital world. [Returning your spider doesn't solve the problem](http://www.27bslash6.com/overdue.html http://www.27bslash6.com/overdue.html). In the digital world, you can't guarantee that the key hasn't been copied, and you can't guarantee that destroying the "original instance" of the key destroys all others. The custom OS that the FBI is asking Apple to build will also take development time, and likely take more than one person to develop, meaning that if there's a security breach during the OS's development, any number of intermediate builds may also be stolen during development, before the FBI can even access the particular phone in question.

rhino369 11y ago
>In the physical example, according to the FBI's "just this one iPhone" claim, one would reasonably expect that the company could then destroy the hypothetical master key as soon as it's used. This makes sense in a physical world, but the analogy breaks down completely in a digital world. Why not? Can't apple just delete it? >In the digital world, you can't guarantee that the key hasn't been copied, and you can't guarantee that destroying the "original instance" of the key destroys all others. You can't do that in the physical world either. But you can be pretty damn certain that it isn't done. >The custom OS that the FBI is asking Apple to build will also take development time, and likely take more than one person to develop, meaning that if there's a security breach during the OS's development, any number of intermediate builds may also be stolen during development, before the FBI can even access the particular phone in question. Apple already takes this risk with every since iOS release.
- _rknLA 11y ago
  Yes, but leaks of pre-release iOS software can't be installed on locked phones as a means of unlocking them, so the risk is not nearly the same. If you really want to carry this analogy to term, fine, I'll concede that you can't be 100% sure that a physical key wasn't copied before you destroy it, but then you must take into consideration the complexity of manufacture and duplication - if the complexity of duplication is high, and you only make one, and guard it at all times, you can have a fairly high confidence (barring ridiculous film plots) that the key you're destroying is the only one. With digital things, the complexity of duplication is beyond trivial. One copy leaks, and instantly there are tens of thousands, if not millions of copies in all corners of the internet. Physical objects simply do not behave this way.

kelnos 11y ago

is it admissible (under the current laws) to ask the Company to make a master key? That's exactly what's under debate. The FBI believes the All Writs Act does allow that, and Apple (and many others) disagree. The safe analogy is a bit flawed[1], but to play it out, the debate is over whether or not a company should be allowed to build and sell an uncrackable safe. Law enforcement appears to say no, and privacy advocates say yes. [1] ... since if you build a safe that's actually uncrackable, it's by definition impossible to later modify it so it will accept some sort of master key, whereas adding software to allow disabling the passcode prompt on a phone is doable after it's built.