6 ms·

Those things aren't really comparable. One is a pre-emptive action taken by government before the commission of a crime, the other is a reactive investigation t

Those things aren't really comparable. One is a pre-emptive action taken by government before the commission of a crime, the other is a reactive investigation tool. I also suspect your gun example might actually generate more outrage at governmental overreach.

throwawayukcyb 11y ago
Side-note: your observation may be valid for this case, but not in the case of backdoored encryption. Backdoored encryption is exactly a pre-emptive action. Relevant b/c I think the real worry in this case is that the FBI is laying the groundwork for a PR campaign for mandated backdoored encryption.
josu 11y ago
"I also suspect your gun example might actually generate more outrage at governmental overreach." I believe that that is his point.
Johnny555 11y ago
Software and hardware are fundamentally different so it's hard to find a close analogy, but if Apple creates this tool (that can be applied to any phone (or at least a large subset of their phones)), it's essentially the same as if the decryption tool were present in every phone, even ones sold before the commission of a crime. The closest parallel I can think of is the Gun Microstamping law (which would require that bullet casings be stamped with a mark identifying the gun it was shot with). This has (as you might expect) generated a lot of controversy and lawsuits. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microstamping https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microstamping
- martin-adams 11y ago
  >> but if Apple creates this tool (that can be applied to any phone (or at least a large subset of their phones)), it's essentially the same as if the decryption tool were present in every phone, even ones sold before the commission of a crime. This concept I find interesting. If Apple did have the ability to create this tool, then is there much of a difference? I guess the difference is whether Apple were to give such a tool to the FBI, rather than creating it, extracting the data and deleting the tool. But who is to say that some clever individual can't create their own tool to achieve the same thing. Until Apple deliver on their desire to create phones you can't decrypt, I would therefore consider all iphones vulnerable.
  - Johnny555 11y ago
    It's true, it's a fine distinction, but there's still a significant different between "There is no software in existence that can break into this phone and we are the only ones that could ever create such software" and "We have software that can break into the phone, but we promise not to use it. Unless someone tells us to and we've already got dozens of such requests in queue."
  - giovannibajo1 11y ago
    Third parties can't do anything because iPhones accept software only if signed by Apple. So Apple is the only one that can create a software that lower its protection level to allow for bruteforce. And Apple can't decrypt the phone: it can remove the bruteforce counter and/or exponential delay, both of which are paramount parts of the security architecture that requires users to be able to unlock the phone using a 6-digit code (4-digits for non Touch ID phones like that in discussion), which in turn is an important UX compromise to allow to reach the goal of having 90% of 1B iOS devices with passcode lock activated. Allowing for a remote bruteforce is basically undermining the whole security architecture. To make a phone that is not bruteforcable, you need to give up on the 6-digit concept, which is already an option (I turned it on on my phone) but it's strongly unlikely to gain widespread acceptance
    - Johnny555 11y ago
      Apple can decrypt the phone -- once they remove the bruteforce protections, it would be trivial for them to bruteforce the typical small phone unlock keyspace. The FBI hasn't asked for this since they can trivially do it themselves, but Apple could certainly do it if they wanted to. And if they are forced into creating this hack, then the next request will be to force them to decrypt the phone too since once manufacturers can be coerced into doing anything that the government demands in a warrant, what restriction would prevent the government from asking for full decryption? Bruteforce protection doesn't mean giving up on a 6 digit passcode, it means making the hardware security module completely hardware only with no way to alter software (or at least unalterable without the unlock code), and with too many brute force tries, the hardware wipes it's copy of the key, which is essentially the same as wiping the disk, but it can't be intercepted by an IOS software change. For added security, it could have a timer so if the phone is not unlocked in X number of days, it wipes its key so if someone steals your phone, it's completely unrecoverable after X days.

throwawayukcyb 11y ago

Side-note: your observation may be valid for this case, but not in the case of backdoored encryption. Backdoored encryption is exactly a pre-emptive action. Relevant b/c I think the real worry in this case is that the FBI is laying the groundwork for a PR campaign for mandated backdoored encryption.

josu 11y ago

"I also suspect your gun example might actually generate more outrage at governmental overreach." I believe that that is his point.

Johnny555 11y ago

Software and hardware are fundamentally different so it's hard to find a close analogy, but if Apple creates this tool (that can be applied to any phone (or at least a large subset of their phones)), it's essentially the same as if the decryption tool were present in every phone, even ones sold before the commission of a crime. The closest parallel I can think of is the Gun Microstamping law (which would require that bullet casings be stamped with a mark identifying the gun it was shot with). This has (as you might expect) generated a lot of controversy and lawsuits. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microstamping https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microstamping

martin-adams 11y ago
>> but if Apple creates this tool (that can be applied to any phone (or at least a large subset of their phones)), it's essentially the same as if the decryption tool were present in every phone, even ones sold before the commission of a crime. This concept I find interesting. If Apple did have the ability to create this tool, then is there much of a difference? I guess the difference is whether Apple were to give such a tool to the FBI, rather than creating it, extracting the data and deleting the tool. But who is to say that some clever individual can't create their own tool to achieve the same thing. Until Apple deliver on their desire to create phones you can't decrypt, I would therefore consider all iphones vulnerable.
- Johnny555 11y ago
  It's true, it's a fine distinction, but there's still a significant different between "There is no software in existence that can break into this phone and we are the only ones that could ever create such software" and "We have software that can break into the phone, but we promise not to use it. Unless someone tells us to and we've already got dozens of such requests in queue."
- giovannibajo1 11y ago
  Third parties can't do anything because iPhones accept software only if signed by Apple. So Apple is the only one that can create a software that lower its protection level to allow for bruteforce. And Apple can't decrypt the phone: it can remove the bruteforce counter and/or exponential delay, both of which are paramount parts of the security architecture that requires users to be able to unlock the phone using a 6-digit code (4-digits for non Touch ID phones like that in discussion), which in turn is an important UX compromise to allow to reach the goal of having 90% of 1B iOS devices with passcode lock activated. Allowing for a remote bruteforce is basically undermining the whole security architecture. To make a phone that is not bruteforcable, you need to give up on the 6-digit concept, which is already an option (I turned it on on my phone) but it's strongly unlikely to gain widespread acceptance
  - Johnny555 11y ago
    Apple can decrypt the phone -- once they remove the bruteforce protections, it would be trivial for them to bruteforce the typical small phone unlock keyspace. The FBI hasn't asked for this since they can trivially do it themselves, but Apple could certainly do it if they wanted to. And if they are forced into creating this hack, then the next request will be to force them to decrypt the phone too since once manufacturers can be coerced into doing anything that the government demands in a warrant, what restriction would prevent the government from asking for full decryption? Bruteforce protection doesn't mean giving up on a 6 digit passcode, it means making the hardware security module completely hardware only with no way to alter software (or at least unalterable without the unlock code), and with too many brute force tries, the hardware wipes it's copy of the key, which is essentially the same as wiping the disk, but it can't be intercepted by an IOS software change. For added security, it could have a timer so if the phone is not unlocked in X number of days, it wipes its key so if someone steals your phone, it's completely unrecoverable after X days.