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Uploading the encrypted content has no value as backup, if you don't have keys that can decrypt it. If the keys are backed up as well, all security is gone.
by hollander 11y ago
Uploading the encrypted content has no value as backup, if you don't have keys that can decrypt it. If the keys are backed up as well, all security is gone.
- ethbro 11y agoIs it that hard to have the phone display an encryption key and have the user copy it to dead tree? As above, not a good idea for a default, but don't see why it wouldn't be technically viable for opt-in protection.
- philipov 11y agoThe hardware key is designed to be impossible to extract from the device. That's part of the security, so you can't simply transfer the data to a phone where protections against brute-forcing the user key have been removed.
- ethbro 11y ago> An encryption key To spell it out (1) request new encryption key from device (let's call it key4cloud); (2) encryption key generated, displayed for physical logging by the user, & stored in the secure enclave; (3) all normal backups to iCloud are now encrypted via key4cloud; (4) user loses phone; (5) user purchases new phone; (6) new phone downloads data; (7) user enters key4cloud from physical notes & decrypts backup Yes, it requires paper and a pencil and user education (hence the opt-in). But it's also incredibly resistant to "Give us all iCloud data on User Y."